‘Everybody’s doing it’: on the persistence of bad social norms

We investigate how information about the preferences of others affects the persistence of ‘bad’ social norms. One view is that bad norms thrive even when people are informed of the preferences of others, since the bad norm is an equilibrium of a coordination game. The other view is based on pluralis...

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Vydáno v:	Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Ročník 23; číslo 2; s. 392 - 420
Hlavní autoři:	Smerdon, David, Offerman, Theo, Gneezy, Uri
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	New York Springer US 01.06.2020 Springer Nature B.V
Témata:	Behavioral/Experimental Economics Coordination Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Ignorance Microeconomics Multiculturalism & pluralism Norms Operations Research/Decision Theory Original Paper Social and Behav. Sciences Social interaction Social norms Uncertainty Pluralistic ignorance Social interactions Equilibrium selection Z10 D90 D70 Conformity C92 Social norms
ISSN:	1386-4157, 1573-6938
On-line přístup:	Získat plný text
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