‘Everybody’s doing it’: on the persistence of bad social norms
We investigate how information about the preferences of others affects the persistence of ‘bad’ social norms. One view is that bad norms thrive even when people are informed of the preferences of others, since the bad norm is an equilibrium of a coordination game. The other view is based on pluralis...
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| Vydané v: | Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Ročník 23; číslo 2; s. 392 - 420 |
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| Hlavní autori: | , , |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | English |
| Vydavateľské údaje: |
New York
Springer US
01.06.2020
Springer Nature B.V |
| Predmet: | |
| ISSN: | 1386-4157, 1573-6938 |
| On-line prístup: | Získať plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | We investigate how information about the preferences of others affects the persistence of ‘bad’ social norms. One view is that bad norms thrive even when people are informed of the preferences of others, since the bad norm is an equilibrium of a coordination game. The other view is based on pluralistic ignorance, in which uncertainty about others’ preferences is crucial. In an experiment, we find clear support for the pluralistic ignorance perspective . In addition, the strength of social interactions is important for a bad norm to persist. These findings help in understanding the causes of such bad norms, and in designing interventions to change them. |
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| Bibliografia: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 1386-4157 1573-6938 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10683-019-09616-z |