A game theoretic model for strategic maintenance and dispatch decisions

Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic market attains a strategic dimension because gencos are often able to manipulate market prices through capacity withdrawal. A closely related issue is that of strategically withholding generation from available capacity. An analytic framework is presented th...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:IEEE transactions on power systems Jg. 19; H. 4; S. 2014 - 2021
1. Verfasser: Chattopadhyay, D.
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: New York IEEE 01.11.2004
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Schlagworte:
ISSN:0885-8950, 1558-0679
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic market attains a strategic dimension because gencos are often able to manipulate market prices through capacity withdrawal. A closely related issue is that of strategically withholding generation from available capacity. An analytic framework is presented that enables joint evaluation of maintenance and generation strategies. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CNE) concept is extended for intertemporal decision making on maintenance and generation for multiple gencos. Each Genco maximizes its profit by strategically putting its capacity on maintenance as well as withholding generation from available capacity, taking into account its rival gencos decisions. The CNE problem is posed as a continuous, or mixed integer, nonlinear programming optimization problem. Duality theory is employed to derive insights about the marginal profit that a genco may earn from an increment in its availability in an oligopolistic market setup. Illustrative numerical examples are presented of CNE maintenance and generation strategies and these are compared and contrasted against those of a perfectly competitive scenario.
Bibliographie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0885-8950
1558-0679
DOI:10.1109/TPWRS.2004.836180