A game theoretic model for strategic maintenance and dispatch decisions

Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic market attains a strategic dimension because gencos are often able to manipulate market prices through capacity withdrawal. A closely related issue is that of strategically withholding generation from available capacity. An analytic framework is presented th...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on power systems Vol. 19; no. 4; pp. 2014 - 2021
Main Author: Chattopadhyay, D.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: New York IEEE 01.11.2004
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subjects:
Australia
Availability
Decision making
Decisions
Distributed power generation
Duality
Economic models
Electricity supply industry
Electricity supply industry deregulation
Game theory
Information security
Maintenance
Markets
Mathematical analysis
Mixed integer
Nash equilibrium
Nonlinear programming
optimal dispatch
planned maintenance
Power generation
Strategy
Studies
Timing
ISSN:0885-8950, 1558-0679
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Maintenance decisions in an oligopolistic market attains a strategic dimension because gencos are often able to manipulate market prices through capacity withdrawal. A closely related issue is that of strategically withholding generation from available capacity. An analytic framework is presented that enables joint evaluation of maintenance and generation strategies. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium (CNE) concept is extended for intertemporal decision making on maintenance and generation for multiple gencos. Each Genco maximizes its profit by strategically putting its capacity on maintenance as well as withholding generation from available capacity, taking into account its rival gencos decisions. The CNE problem is posed as a continuous, or mixed integer, nonlinear programming optimization problem. Duality theory is employed to derive insights about the marginal profit that a genco may earn from an increment in its availability in an oligopolistic market setup. Illustrative numerical examples are presented of CNE maintenance and generation strategies and these are compared and contrasted against those of a perfectly competitive scenario.
Bibliography:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ObjectType-Article-2
ObjectType-Feature-1
content type line 23
ISSN:0885-8950
1558-0679
DOI:10.1109/TPWRS.2004.836180