Multi-level attacks: An emerging security concern for cryptographic hardware

Modern hardware and software implementations of cryptographic algorithms are subject to multiple sophisticated attacks, such as differential power analysis (DPA) and fault-based attacks. In addition, modern integrated circuit (IC) design and manufacturing follows a horizontal business model where di...

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Veröffentlicht in:2011 Design, Automation & Test in Europe S. 1 - 4
Hauptverfasser: Ali, S S, Chakraborty, R S, Mukhopadhyay, D, Bhunia, S
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: IEEE 01.03.2011
Schlagworte:
Circuit faults
Encryption
Hardware
Integrated circuits
Manufacturing
Trojan horses
ISBN:9781612842080, 1612842089
ISSN:1530-1591
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:Modern hardware and software implementations of cryptographic algorithms are subject to multiple sophisticated attacks, such as differential power analysis (DPA) and fault-based attacks. In addition, modern integrated circuit (IC) design and manufacturing follows a horizontal business model where different third-party vendors provide hardware, software and manufacturing services, thus making it difficult to ensure the trustworthiness of the entire process. Such business practices make the designs vulnerable to hard-to-detect malicious modifications by an adversary, termed as "Hardware Trojans". In this paper, we show that malicious nexus between multiple parties at different stages of the design, manufacturing and deployment makes the attacks on cryptographic hardware more potent. We describe the general model of such an attack, which we refer to as Multi-level Attack, and provide an example of it on the hardware implementation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm, where a hardware Trojan is embedded in the design. We then analytically show that the resultant attack poses a significantly stronger threat than that from a Trojan attack by a single adversary. We validate our theoretical analysis using power simulation results as well as hardware measurement and emulation on a FPGA platform.
ISBN:9781612842080
1612842089
ISSN:1530-1591
DOI:10.1109/DATE.2011.5763307