Confessing Victims and Victim Testimony
Judith Butler’s model of confession maintains agency in both the doing of the deed and the admission of that deed in speech, but victim testimony works differently. In acts of victim testimony, when one describes the injustices one has suffered, the admission of the deed connotes a certain agency at...
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| Vydáno v: | Feminist philosophy quarterly Ročník 11; číslo 2 |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
University of Western Ontario
01.06.2025
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| Témata: | |
| ISSN: | 2371-2570 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | Judith Butler’s model of confession maintains agency in both the doing of the deed and the admission of that deed in speech, but victim testimony works differently. In acts of victim testimony, when one describes the injustices one has suffered, the admission of the deed connotes a certain agency at odds with the lack of agency to which one testifies. This structure undermines the credibility of victim testimony. Leveraging Kate Manne’s theory of victimhood, I bring victim testimony into a conversation that often imagines confession as the paradigmatic speech act that forms the subject. By critically investigating the differences between confession and testimony and their frequent confusions, I attend to the social locations in which these speech acts are uttered and the gendered bodies that utter them. I suggest that we consider how subjects are formed not only in confession but also when pressed to answer the questions “What happened to you?” or “What did he do to you?” |
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| ISSN: | 2371-2570 |