Run-time Detection of Prime + Probe Side-Channel Attack on AES Encryption Algorithm
This paper presents a run-time detection mechanism for access-driven cache-based Side-Channel Attacks (CSCAs) on Intel's x86 architecture. We demonstrate the detection capability and effectiveness of proposed mechanism on Prime+Probe attcks. The mechanism comprises of multiple machine learning...
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| Vydáno v: | 2018 Global Information Infrastructure and Networking Symposium (GIIS) s. 1 - 5 |
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| Hlavní autoři: | , , , , , |
| Médium: | Konferenční příspěvek |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
IEEE
01.10.2018
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| Témata: | |
| ISSN: | 2150-329X |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | This paper presents a run-time detection mechanism for access-driven cache-based Side-Channel Attacks (CSCAs) on Intel's x86 architecture. We demonstrate the detection capability and effectiveness of proposed mechanism on Prime+Probe attcks. The mechanism comprises of multiple machine learning models, which use real-time data from the HPCs for detection. Experiments are performed with two different implementations of AES cryptosystem while under Prime+Probe attack. We provide results under stringent design constraints such as: realistic system load conditions, real-time detection accuracy, speed, system-wide performance overhead and distribution of error (i.e., false positives and negatives) for the used machine learning models. Our results show detection accuracy of > 99% for Prime+Probe attack with performance overhead of 3-4% at the highest detection speed, i.e., within 1-2% completion of 4800 AES encryption rounds needed to complete a successful attack. |
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| ISSN: | 2150-329X |
| DOI: | 10.1109/GIIS.2018.8635767 |