Number-Theoretic Attack on Lyuu-Wu's Multi-proxy Multi-signature Scheme

Y. D. Lyuu and M. L. Wu had proposed an improved multi-proxy multi-signature scheme, which was claimed to resist the forge attack. Lately, L. Guo and G. Wang found an inside attack on the Lyuu-Wu's scheme. In this paper, we propose a new attack on Lyuu-Wu's scheme, which can factor the par...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:2009 fifth International Conference on Information Assurance and Security : 18-20 August 2009 Jg. 1; S. 666 - 668
Hauptverfasser: Fanyu Kong, Jia Yu
Format: Tagungsbericht
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: IEEE 01.08.2009
Schlagworte:
digital signature
Digital signatures
Educational institutions
Information security
Information systems
multi-proxy multi-signature scheme
number-theoretic algorithm
Polynomials
Public key
Resists
security attack
Zinc
ISBN:0769537448, 9780769537443
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:Y. D. Lyuu and M. L. Wu had proposed an improved multi-proxy multi-signature scheme, which was claimed to resist the forge attack. Lately, L. Guo and G. Wang found an inside attack on the Lyuu-Wu's scheme. In this paper, we propose a new attack on Lyuu-Wu's scheme, which can factor the parameter N and Q by using efficient number-theoretic algorithms when Q is roughly larger than the square root of N. It follows that Lyuu-Wu's scheme suffers from the forge attack from the proxy signers in that case.
ISBN:0769537448
9780769537443
DOI:10.1109/IAS.2009.130