The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization

We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of n additive bidders whose values for m heterogeneous items are drawn independently. For any such instance and any ε>0, we show tha...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	2018 IEEE 59th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) pp. 416 - 426
Main Authors:	Gonczarowski, Yannai A., Weinberg, S. Matthew
Format:	Conference Proceeding
Language:	English
Published:	IEEE 01.10.2018
Subjects:	Additives algorithmic game theory algorithmic mechanism design approximate revenue maximization auctions Bayes methods Complexity theory Computational modeling Cost accounting Economics generalization bounds multi dimensional auctions PAC learning Resource management sample complexity
ISSN:	2575-8454
Online Access:	Get full text
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