The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of n additive bidders whose values for m heterogeneous items are drawn independently. For any such instance and any ε>0, we show tha...
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| Vydáno v: | 2018 IEEE 59th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) s. 416 - 426 |
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| Hlavní autoři: | , |
| Médium: | Konferenční příspěvek |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
IEEE
01.10.2018
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| Témata: | |
| ISSN: | 2575-8454 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | We consider the sample complexity of revenue maximization for multiple bidders in unrestricted multi-dimensional settings. Specifically, we study the standard model of n additive bidders whose values for m heterogeneous items are drawn independently. For any such instance and any ε>0, we show that it is possible to learn an ε-Bayesian Incentive Compatible auction whose expected revenue is within ε of the optimal ε-BIC auction from only polynomially many samples. Our approach is based on ideas that hold quite generally, and completely sidestep the difficulty of characterizing optimal (or near-optimal) auctions for these settings. Therefore, our results easily extend to general multi-dimensional settings, including valuations that aren't necessarily even subadditive, and arbitrary allocation constraints. For the cases of a single bidder and many goods, or a single parameter (good) and many bidders, our analysis yields exact incentive compatibility (and for the latter also computational efficiency). Although the single-parameter case is already well-understood, our corollary for this case extends slightly the state-of-the-art. |
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| ISSN: | 2575-8454 |
| DOI: | 10.1109/FOCS.2018.00047 |