Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach

An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characte...

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Veröffentlicht in:Theoretical economics Jg. 13; H. 2; S. 607 - 635
1. Verfasser: Kolotilin, Anton
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: New Haven, CT The Econometric Society 01.05.2018
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
John Wiley & Sons, Inc
Schlagworte:
Bayesian persuasion
C72
Communications equipment
D82
D83
Disclosure
Disclosure of information
Economic theory
Information
information design
information disclosure
informed receiver
Linear programming
ISSN:1555-7561, 1933-6837, 1555-7561
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:An uninformed sender designs a mechanism that discloses information about her type to a privately informed receiver, who then decides whether to act. I impose a single-crossing assumption, so that the receiver with a higher type is more willing to act. Using a linear programming approach, I characterize optimal information disclosure and provide conditions under which full and no revelation are optimal. Assuming further that the sender's utility depends only on the sender's expected type, I provide conditions under which interval revelation is optimal. Finally, I show that the expected utilities are not monotonic in the precision of the receiver's private information.
Bibliographie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:1555-7561
1933-6837
1555-7561
DOI:10.3982/TE1805