Coercion, compliance, and the collapse of the Soviet command economy

Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not appear unstable. Why, then, did it collapse? A game between a dictator and a producer shows that a high level of coercion may yield a sta...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:	The Economic history review Vol. 55; no. 3; pp. 397 - 433
Main Author:	Harrison, Mark
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 01.08.2002 Blackwell Publishers Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Subjects:	Capital costs Coercion Collapse Command guidance Commands Dictators Dictatorship Economic costs Economic Crises Economic History Economic reform Economic Systems Economics Game Theory History Labor Movements Labor Relations Monitoring costs Planned economies Planned economy Reputations State Power Strikes Surveys and Speculations Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Union of Soviet Socialist Republics > USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ISSN:	0013-0117, 1468-0289
Online Access:	Get full text
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