Coercion, compliance, and the collapse of the Soviet command economy

Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not appear unstable. Why, then, did it collapse? A game between a dictator and a producer shows that a high level of coercion may yield a sta...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Economic history review Jg. 55; H. 3; S. 397 - 433
1. Verfasser:	Harrison, Mark
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Oxford, UK and Boston, USA Blackwell Publishers Ltd 01.08.2002 Blackwell Publishers Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Schlagworte:	Capital costs Coercion Collapse Command guidance Commands Dictators Dictatorship Economic costs Economic Crises Economic History Economic reform Economic Systems Economics Game Theory History Labor Movements Labor Relations Monitoring costs Planned economies Planned economy Reputations State Power Strikes Surveys and Speculations Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Union of Soviet Socialist Republics > USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ISSN:	0013-0117, 1468-0289
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Are command systems that rest on coercion inherently unstable, and did the Soviet economy collapse for this reason? Until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not appear unstable. Why, then, did it collapse? A game between a dictator and a producer shows that a high level of coercion may yield a stable high-output equilibrium, that stability may rest in part on the dictator's reputation, and that a collapse may be brought about by adverse trends in the dictator's costs and a loss of reputation. The facts of the Soviet case are consistent with a collapse that was triggered by the strike movement of 1989.
Bibliographie:	ark:/67375/WNG-G91LHJ22-B istex:26A6931A1030AB5B16DFC1B110F4A873B74944C2 ArticleID:EHR226 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2
ISSN:	0013-0117 1468-0289
DOI:	10.1111/1468-0289.00226