Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment

The problem of multitasking refers to the challenge of designing incentives to motivate appropriate effort across multiple tasks when the desired outcomes for some tasks are more difficult to measure than others. Multitasking is pervasive in health care. I use a simple model to show that the problem...

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Vydané v:Journal of health economics Ročník 24; číslo 1; s. 211 - 223
Hlavný autor: Eggleston, Karen
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: Netherlands Elsevier B.V 2005
Elsevier
Edícia:Journal of Health Economics
Predmet:
Economic incentives
Health care
Health economics
Health expenditure
Measurement
Medical treatment
Mixed systems
Models, Econometric
Multiple task performance
Multitasking
Payments
Performance measurement
Performance related pay
Provider payment
Providers
Quality of Health Care
Reimbursement Mechanisms
United States
USA
United States
I10
Multitasking
Mixed systems
Provider payment
ISSN:0167-6296, 1879-1646
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Shrnutí:The problem of multitasking refers to the challenge of designing incentives to motivate appropriate effort across multiple tasks when the desired outcomes for some tasks are more difficult to measure than others. Multitasking is pervasive in health care. I use a simple model to show that the problem of multitasking further strengthens conventional arguments for mixed payment systems such as partial capitation. When pay-for-performance metrics are imperfect for rewarding service-specific quality efforts, using mixed payment helps to balance incentives for quality effort across services.
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ISSN:0167-6296
1879-1646
DOI:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001