Multitasking and mixed systems for provider payment

The problem of multitasking refers to the challenge of designing incentives to motivate appropriate effort across multiple tasks when the desired outcomes for some tasks are more difficult to measure than others. Multitasking is pervasive in health care. I use a simple model to show that the problem...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of health economics Vol. 24; no. 1; pp. 211 - 223
Main Author: Eggleston, Karen
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Netherlands Elsevier B.V 2005
Elsevier
Series:Journal of Health Economics
Subjects:
Economic incentives
Health care
Health economics
Health expenditure
Measurement
Medical treatment
Mixed systems
Models, Econometric
Multiple task performance
Multitasking
Payments
Performance measurement
Performance related pay
Provider payment
Providers
Quality of Health Care
Reimbursement Mechanisms
United States
USA
United States
I10
Multitasking
Mixed systems
Provider payment
ISSN:0167-6296, 1879-1646
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The problem of multitasking refers to the challenge of designing incentives to motivate appropriate effort across multiple tasks when the desired outcomes for some tasks are more difficult to measure than others. Multitasking is pervasive in health care. I use a simple model to show that the problem of multitasking further strengthens conventional arguments for mixed payment systems such as partial capitation. When pay-for-performance metrics are imperfect for rewarding service-specific quality efforts, using mixed payment helps to balance incentives for quality effort across services.
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ISSN:0167-6296
1879-1646
DOI:10.1016/j.jhealeco.2004.09.001