Do people make decisions under risk based on ignorance? An empirical test of the priority heuristic against cumulative prospect theory

Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig [Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). The Priority Heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs. Psychological Review, 113(2), 409–432] put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. Accord...

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Veröffentlicht in:Organizational behavior and human decision processes Jg. 107; H. 1; S. 75 - 95
Hauptverfasser: Glöckner, Andreas, Betsch, Tilmann
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Amsterdam Elsevier Inc 01.09.2008
Elsevier
Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc
Schriftenreihe:Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
Schlagworte:
Biological and medical sciences
Bounded rationality
Cognition. Intelligence
Cumulative prospect theory
Decision latency
Decision making
Decision making models
Decision making. Choice
Decision strategy
Decisions
Expected utility
Fast and frugal heuristics
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Heuristic
Heuristics
Ignorance
Individual behaviour
Information
Organizational behaviour
Predictions
Priorities
Process tracing
Prospect theory
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Risk theory
Risks
Studies
Variables
Decision latency
Fast and frugal heuristics
Cumulative prospect theory
Decision strategy
Process tracing
Bounded rationality
Human
Rational irrational
Decision making
Theory
Heuristics
Risk
Experimental study
Strategy
ISSN:0749-5978, 1095-9920
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig [Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., & Hertwig, R. (2006). The Priority Heuristic: Making choices without trade-offs. Psychological Review, 113(2), 409–432] put forward the priority heuristic (PH) as a fast and frugal heuristic for decisions under risk. According to the PH, individuals do not make trade-offs between gains and probabilities, as proposed by expected utility models such as cumulative prospect theory (CPT), but use information in a non-compensatory manner and ignore information. We conducted three studies to test the PH empirically by analyzing individual choice patterns, decision times and information search parameters in diagnostic decision tasks. Results on all three dependent variables conflict with the predictions of the PH and can be better explained by the CPT. The predictive accuracy of the PH was high for decision tasks in which the predictions align with the predictions of the CPT but very low for decision tasks in which this was not the case. The findings indicate that earlier results supporting the PH might have been caused by the selection of decision tasks that were not diagnostic for the PH as compared to CPT.
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ISSN:0749-5978
1095-9920
DOI:10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.02.003