Power in voting rules with abstention: an axiomatization of a two components power index

In order to study voting situations when voters can also abstain and the output is binary, i.e., either approval or rejection, a new extended model of voting rule was defined. Accordingly, indices of power, in particular Banzhaf’s index, were considered. In this paper we argue that in this context a...

Celý popis

Uložené v:
Podrobná bibliografia
Vydané v:Annals of operations research Ročník 244; číslo 2; s. 455 - 474
Hlavní autori: Freixas, Josep, Lucchetti, Roberto
Médium: Journal Article Publikácia
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: New York Springer US 01.09.2016
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
Predmet:
05 Combinatorics
05C Graph theory
90 Operations research, mathematical programming
90B Operations research and management science
94 Information And Communication, Circuits
94C Circuits, networks
Abstencionisme electoral
Abstention
Axiomes
Axioms
Business and Management
Classificació AMS
Combinatorics
Decision making
Decision making process
Decisió, Presa de
Electoral reform
Game theory
Games
Investigació operativa
Jocs, Teoria de
Matemàtiques i estadística
Mathematical models
Models matemàtics
Operations research
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Power
Proposals
Real numbers
Rejection
Switching
Teoria de jocs
Theory of Computation
Vot
Voters
Voting
Voting systems in democratic organizations
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC
91A12
05C65
91A35
Axioms
Decision making process
Voting systems in democratic organizations
90B50
94C10
Power
Abstention
ISSN:0254-5330, 1572-9338
On-line prístup:Získať plný text
Tagy: Pridať tag
Žiadne tagy, Buďte prvý, kto otaguje tento záznam!
Popis
Shrnutí:In order to study voting situations when voters can also abstain and the output is binary, i.e., either approval or rejection, a new extended model of voting rule was defined. Accordingly, indices of power, in particular Banzhaf’s index, were considered. In this paper we argue that in this context a power index should be a pair of real numbers, since this better highlights the power of a voter in two different cases, i.e., her being crucial when switching from being in favor to abstain, and from abstain to be contrary. We also provide an axiomatization for both indices, and from this a characterization as well of the standard Banzhaf index (the sum of the former two) is obtained. Some examples are provided to show how the indices behave.
Bibliografia:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
content type line 23
ISSN:0254-5330
1572-9338
DOI:10.1007/s10479-016-2124-5