Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories

•Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories.•Stronger belief in conspiracy theories associated with lower analytic thinking.•Eliciting analytic thinking experimentally reduces conspiracist ideation. Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Cognition Vol. 133; no. 3; pp. 572 - 585
Main Authors: Swami, Viren, Voracek, Martin, Stieger, Stefan, Tran, Ulrich S., Furnham, Adrian
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.12.2014
Elsevier
Subjects:
Adolescent
Adult
Aged
Analytic thinking
Beliefs
Biological and medical sciences
Cognition
Cognition. Intelligence
Conspiracy
Conspiracy theories
Culture
England
Experiential thinking
Female
Fundamental and applied biological sciences. Psychology
Humans
Male
Middle Aged
Miscellaneous
Open-mindedness
Personality
Population
Psychology. Psychoanalysis. Psychiatry
Psychology. Psychophysiology
Social psychology
Social theory
Thinking
Thinking dispositions
United Kingdom
Young Adult
Conspiracy theories
Experiential thinking
Analytic thinking
Thinking dispositions
Open-mindedness
Belief
Human
Conspiracy theory
Cognition
ISSN:0010-0277, 1873-7838, 1873-7838
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:•Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories.•Stronger belief in conspiracy theories associated with lower analytic thinking.•Eliciting analytic thinking experimentally reduces conspiracist ideation. Belief in conspiracy theories has been associated with a range of negative health, civic, and social outcomes, requiring reliable methods of reducing such belief. Thinking dispositions have been highlighted as one possible factor associated with belief in conspiracy theories, but actual relationships have only been infrequently studied. In Study 1, we examined associations between belief in conspiracy theories and a range of measures of thinking dispositions in a British sample (N=990). Results indicated that a stronger belief in conspiracy theories was significantly associated with lower analytic thinking and open-mindedness and greater intuitive thinking. In Studies 2–4, we examined the causational role played by analytic thinking in relation to conspiracist ideation. In Study 2 (N=112), we showed that a verbal fluency task that elicited analytic thinking reduced belief in conspiracy theories. In Study 3 (N=189), we found that an alternative method of eliciting analytic thinking, which related to cognitive disfluency, was effective at reducing conspiracist ideation in a student sample. In Study 4, we replicated the results of Study 3 among a general population sample (N=140) in relation to generic conspiracist ideation and belief in conspiracy theories about the July 7, 2005, bombings in London. Our results highlight the potential utility of supporting attempts to promote analytic thinking as a means of countering the widespread acceptance of conspiracy theories.
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ISSN:0010-0277
1873-7838
1873-7838
DOI:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006