Moral Distress and Moral Conflict in Clinical Ethics

Much research is currently being conducted on health care practitioners' experiences of moral distress, especially the experience of nurses. What moral distress is, however, is not always clearly delineated and there is some debate as to how it should be defined. This article aims to help to cl...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Bioethics Jg. 29; H. 2; S. 91 - 97
1. Verfasser:	Fourie, Carina
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	England Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.02.2015
Schlagworte:	Clinical research Concept Formation Conceptual analysis Conflict Conflict (Psychology) Confusion Constraints Dissent and Disputes Doctors Emotional Abuse Ethical Analysis Ethics Ethics, Clinical Health care Health Care Services Health services Humans Medical personnel Medical service Mental health services moral conflict moral constraint moral distress Moral Obligations Morality Morals Nurses nursing ethics Professional ethics Psychological Distress Research ethics Stress, Psychological Teachers moral distress moral constraint nursing ethics moral conflict
ISSN:	0269-9702, 1467-8519, 1467-8519
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Much research is currently being conducted on health care practitioners' experiences of moral distress, especially the experience of nurses. What moral distress is, however, is not always clearly delineated and there is some debate as to how it should be defined. This article aims to help to clarify moral distress. My methodology consists primarily of a conceptual analysis, with especial focus on Andrew Jameton's influential description of moral distress. I will identify and aim to resolve two sources of confusion about moral distress: (1) the compound nature of a narrow definition of distress which stipulates a particular cause, i.e. moral constraint, and (2) the distinction drawn between moral dilemma (or, more accurately, moral conflict) and moral distress, which implies that the two are mutually exclusive. In light of these concerns, I argue that the definition of moral distress should be revised so that moral constraint should not be a necessary condition of moral distress, and that moral conflict should be included as a potential cause of distress. Ultimately, I claim that moral distress should be understood as a specific psychological response to morally challenging situations such as those of moral constraint or moral conflict, or both.
Bibliographie:	ark:/67375/WNG-J8MTL1X9-1 ArticleID:BIOE12064 Swiss National Science Foundation istex:8F5B1EF9B4A6C9719F6C4A1240D5B48317482023 ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 content type line 23
ISSN:	0269-9702 1467-8519 1467-8519
DOI:	10.1111/bioe.12064