Efficient earmarking under decentralized fiscal commitments

Earmarked federal grants are ubiquitous and significant. Traditional fiscal federalism is unable to explain these grants’ widespread utilization. Recent arguments focusing on the potential benefits of centralized earmarking in reducing incentives for the creation of soft budgets at subcentral govern...

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Vydáno v:International tax and public finance Ročník 22; číslo 4; s. 683 - 701
Hlavní autor: Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: New York Springer US 01.08.2015
Springer Nature B.V
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ISSN:0927-5940, 1573-6970
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Shrnutí:Earmarked federal grants are ubiquitous and significant. Traditional fiscal federalism is unable to explain these grants’ widespread utilization. Recent arguments focusing on the potential benefits of centralized earmarking in reducing incentives for the creation of soft budgets at subcentral government levels merit formalization. I show that universal earmarking improves the efficiency of a federation in which regional governments are able to commit to provision of all regional public goods. However, efficient earmarking need not be universal: It should only involve private consumption and fiscal budgets for public goods subject to decentralized fiscal commitments.
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ISSN:0927-5940
1573-6970
DOI:10.1007/s10797-015-9365-0