Incentive and welfare implications of cross-holdings in oligopoly

Competitive implications of cross-holdings have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Incentives for engaging cross-holdings and welfare effects were however rarely studied. Although a similar logic as with the merger paradox holds for Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and symmetr...

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Published in:Economic theory Vol. 77; no. 4; pp. 975 - 997
Main Authors: Ma, Hongkun, Qin, Cheng-Zhong, Zeng, Chenhang
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.06.2024
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
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ISSN:0938-2259, 1432-0479
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Competitive implications of cross-holdings have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Incentives for engaging cross-holdings and welfare effects were however rarely studied. Although a similar logic as with the merger paradox holds for Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and symmetric technologies, we show that there are profit incentives for firms to engage cross-holdings with asymmetric technologies. Furthermore, we show that social welfare could be enhanced with cross-holdings even though the market becomes more concentrated. We also discuss the robustness of both the submodularity of the Cournot model with respect to the presence of cross-holdings and our results with respect to product differentiation.
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ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-021-01398-x