Incentive and welfare implications of cross-holdings in oligopoly
Competitive implications of cross-holdings have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Incentives for engaging cross-holdings and welfare effects were however rarely studied. Although a similar logic as with the merger paradox holds for Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and symmetr...
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| Published in: | Economic theory Vol. 77; no. 4; pp. 975 - 997 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Berlin/Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
01.06.2024
Springer Springer Nature B.V |
| Subjects: | |
| ISSN: | 0938-2259, 1432-0479 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Competitive implications of cross-holdings have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Incentives for engaging cross-holdings and welfare effects were however rarely studied. Although a similar logic as with the merger paradox holds for Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and symmetric technologies, we show that there are profit incentives for firms to engage cross-holdings with asymmetric technologies. Furthermore, we show that social welfare could be enhanced with cross-holdings even though the market becomes more concentrated. We also discuss the robustness of both the submodularity of the Cournot model with respect to the presence of cross-holdings and our results with respect to product differentiation. |
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 0938-2259 1432-0479 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s00199-021-01398-x |