Incentive and welfare implications of cross-holdings in oligopoly

Competitive implications of cross-holdings have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Incentives for engaging cross-holdings and welfare effects were however rarely studied. Although a similar logic as with the merger paradox holds for Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and symmetr...

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Vydáno v:Economic theory Ročník 77; číslo 4; s. 975 - 997
Hlavní autoři: Ma, Hongkun, Qin, Cheng-Zhong, Zeng, Chenhang
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Berlin/Heidelberg Springer Berlin Heidelberg 01.06.2024
Springer
Springer Nature B.V
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ISSN:0938-2259, 1432-0479
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Shrnutí:Competitive implications of cross-holdings have been extensively analyzed in the literature. Incentives for engaging cross-holdings and welfare effects were however rarely studied. Although a similar logic as with the merger paradox holds for Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and symmetric technologies, we show that there are profit incentives for firms to engage cross-holdings with asymmetric technologies. Furthermore, we show that social welfare could be enhanced with cross-holdings even though the market becomes more concentrated. We also discuss the robustness of both the submodularity of the Cournot model with respect to the presence of cross-holdings and our results with respect to product differentiation.
Bibliografie:ObjectType-Article-1
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content type line 14
ISSN:0938-2259
1432-0479
DOI:10.1007/s00199-021-01398-x