Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects

A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to a...

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Vydané v:	Econometrica Ročník 77; číslo 5; s. 1607 - 1636
Hlavní autori:	Andreoni, James, Bernheim, B. Douglas
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2009 Econometric Society Wiley-Blackwell
Predmet:	Altruism Applications audience effects Biology, psychology, social sciences dictator game Dictators Economic theory Exact sciences and technology Experiments Explanation Fairness Fractions Game theory Games Hypotheses Inference Insurance, economics, finance Laboratories Mathematical functions Mathematics Observed choices Probability and statistics Probability theory and stochastic processes Property Sciences and techniques of general use Self image signaling Signalling Social image Social relations Special processes (renewal theory, markov renewal processes, semi-markov processes, statistical mechanics type models, applications) Statistics Studies Test theory Unilateralism Validity audience effects signaling Social image Economic sciences Care Dictator game Statistical method Hypothesis test Theoretical model altruism Environment Economic aspect Econometrics
ISSN:	0012-9682, 1468-0262
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Abstract	A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual. The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider an alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to be perceived as fair. The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments.
AbstractList	A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual. The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider an alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to be perceived as fair. The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments. A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual. The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider an alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to be perceived as fair. The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments. Reprinted by permission of the Econometric Society A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual. The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider an alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to be perceived as fair. The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]
Author	Andreoni, James Bernheim, B. Douglas
Author_xml	– sequence: 1 givenname: James surname: Andreoni fullname: Andreoni, James – sequence: 2 givenname: B. Douglas surname: Bernheim fullname: Bernheim, B. Douglas
BackLink	http://pascal-francis.inist.fr/vibad/index.php?action=getRecordDetail&idt=22053905$$DView record in Pascal Francis
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CODEN	ECMTA7
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Copyright	Copyright 2009 The Econometric Society 2009 The Econometric Society 2009 INIST-CNRS Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Sep 2009
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Keywords	audience effects signaling Social image Economic sciences Care Dictator game Statistical method Hypothesis test Theoretical model altruism Environment Economic aspect Econometrics
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Notes	istex:F80653828FEFE6B2FB3C421842BDF0BCD21B8D3E ark:/67375/WNG-2VHVD1VC-7 ArticleID:ECTA970 We are indebted to the following people for helpful comments: Iris Bohnet, Colin Camerer, Navin Kartik, Antonio Rangel, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the California Institute of Technology, NYU, and Stanford University's SITE Workshop in Psychology and Economics. We acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation through grant numbers SES‐0551296 (Andreoni) and SES‐0452300 (Bernheim). SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23
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PublicationTitle	Econometrica
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(1996): "Bequest Behavior and the Effect of Heirs' Earnings: Testing the Altruistic Model of Bequests," American Economic Review, 86, 874-892. Andreoni, J. (1989): "Giving With Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence," Journal of Political Economy, 97, 1447-1458. Bernheim, B. D., and S. Severinov (2003): "Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle," Journal of Political Economy, 111, 733-764. Bloom, D. E. 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publication-title: Southern Economic Journal – volume: 6 start-page: 347 year: 1994 end-page: 369 article-title: The Statistical Analysis of Experiments With Simple Bargaining Games publication-title: Games and Economic Behavior – volume: 86 start-page: 349 year: 1996 end-page: 373 article-title: Veblen Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 90 start-page: 166 year: 2000 end-page: 193 article-title: ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition publication-title: American Economic Review – volume: 55 start-page: 1349 year: 1987 end-page: 1365 article-title: Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games With a Continuum of Types publication-title: Econometrica – volume: 40 start-page: 1 year: 2002 end-page: 24 article-title: What Makes an Allocation Fair? 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Snippet	A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in... A norm of 50–50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in...
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SubjectTerms	Altruism Applications audience effects Biology, psychology, social sciences dictator game Dictators Economic theory Exact sciences and technology Experiments Explanation Fairness Fractions Game theory Games Hypotheses Inference Insurance, economics, finance Laboratories Mathematical functions Mathematics Observed choices Probability and statistics Probability theory and stochastic processes Property Sciences and techniques of general use Self image signaling Signalling Social image Social relations Special processes (renewal theory, markov renewal processes, semi-markov processes, statistical mechanics type models, applications) Statistics Studies Test theory Unilateralism Validity
Title	Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects
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