Social Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience Effects

A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to a...

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Vydáno v:	Econometrica Ročník 77; číslo 5; s. 1607 - 1636
Hlavní autoři:	Andreoni, James, Bernheim, B. Douglas
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	Oxford, UK Blackwell Publishing Ltd 01.09.2009 Econometric Society Wiley-Blackwell
Témata:	Altruism Applications audience effects Biology, psychology, social sciences dictator game Dictators Economic theory Exact sciences and technology Experiments Explanation Fairness Fractions Game theory Games Hypotheses Inference Insurance, economics, finance Laboratories Mathematical functions Mathematics Observed choices Probability and statistics Probability theory and stochastic processes Property Sciences and techniques of general use Self image signaling Signalling Social image Social relations Special processes (renewal theory, markov renewal processes, semi-markov processes, statistical mechanics type models, applications) Statistics Studies Test theory Unilateralism Validity audience effects signaling Social image Economic sciences Care Dictator game Statistical method Hypothesis test Theoretical model altruism Environment Economic aspect Econometrics
ISSN:	0012-9682, 1468-0262
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Popis
Shrnutí:	A norm of 50-50 division appears to have considerable force in a wide range of economic environments, both in the real world and in the laboratory. Even in settings where one party unilaterally determines the allocation of a prize (the dictator game), many subjects voluntarily cede exactly half to another individual. The hypothesis that people care about fairness does not by itself account for key experimental patterns. We consider an alternative explanation, which adds the hypothesis that people like to be perceived as fair. The properties of equilibria for the resulting signaling game correspond closely to laboratory observations. The theory has additional testable implications, the validity of which we confirm through new experiments.
Bibliografie:	istex:F80653828FEFE6B2FB3C421842BDF0BCD21B8D3E ark:/67375/WNG-2VHVD1VC-7 ArticleID:ECTA970 We are indebted to the following people for helpful comments: Iris Bohnet, Colin Camerer, Navin Kartik, Antonio Rangel, three anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the California Institute of Technology, NYU, and Stanford University's SITE Workshop in Psychology and Economics. We acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation through grant numbers SES‐0551296 (Andreoni) and SES‐0452300 (Bernheim). SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23
ISSN:	0012-9682 1468-0262
DOI:	10.3982/ECTA7384