Transaction Costs and the Design of Cropshare Contracts

Modern cropshare contracts are explained using a model in which agents are risk neutral and contract rules are chosen to maximize expected joint wealth. It is shown that the farmer either bears the entire cost of inputs or shares the costs with the landowner in the same proportion as the output. The...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Rand journal of economics Jg. 24; H. 1; S. 78 - 100
Hauptverfasser:	Allen, Douglas W., Lueck, Dean
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Mount Morris, Ill Rand 01.04.1993 The RAND Corporation Rand Corp Rand Corporation
Schriftenreihe:	RAND Journal of Economics
Schlagworte:	Agricultural economics Agricultural land Agricultural production Coefficients Community supported agriculture Contracts Costs Crop economics Crop insurance Crops Data Economic models Farm economics Farmers Fertilizers Landowners Sharecropping Sharing Statistical analysis Studies Transaction costs Variable costs Wealth South Dakota United States > US Nebraska
ISSN:	0741-6261, 1756-2171
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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