Fault Injection Attacks on Cryptographic Devices: Theory, Practice, and Countermeasures

Implementations of cryptographic algorithms continue to proliferate in consumer products due to the increasing demand for secure transmission of confidential information. Although the current standard cryptographic algorithms proved to withstand exhaustive attacks, their hardware and software implem...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Proceedings of the IEEE Vol. 100; no. 11; pp. 3056 - 3076
Main Authors: Barenghi, Alessandro, Breveglieri, Luca, Koren, Israel, Naccache, David
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: New York, NY IEEE 01.11.2012
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE)
Subjects:
Algorithm design and analysis
Algorithms
Applied sciences
Budgeting
Channels
Circuit faults
Computer Science
Countermeasures
cryptographic devices
Cryptography
Cryptography and Security
Devices
Encryption
Exact sciences and technology
Fault diagnosis
fault injection
Faults
Information, signal and communications theory
Military technology
power analysis
Power systems
Public key
Services and terminals of telecommunications
side-channel attacks
Signal and communications theory
Systems, networks and services of telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and information theory
Telemetry. Remote supervision. Telewarning. Remote control
Side channel attack
Vulnerability
Encryption
Intruder detector
Algorithm
Implementation
Remote sensing
power analysis
side-channel attacks
Surveillance
cryptographic devices
Security of data
Electric power consumption
Countermeasures
Software
fault injection
Cryptography
Cost lowering
Remote supervision
Defect detection
ISSN:0018-9219, 1558-2256
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Implementations of cryptographic algorithms continue to proliferate in consumer products due to the increasing demand for secure transmission of confidential information. Although the current standard cryptographic algorithms proved to withstand exhaustive attacks, their hardware and software implementations have exhibited vulnerabilities to side channel attacks, e.g., power analysis and fault injection attacks. This paper focuses on fault injection attacks that have been shown to require inexpensive equipment and a short amount of time. The paper provides a comprehensive description of these attacks on cryptographic devices and the countermeasures that have been developed against them. After a brief review of the widely used cryptographic algorithms, we classify the currently known fault injection attacks into low-cost ones (which a single attacker with a modest budget can mount) and high-cost ones (requiring highly skilled attackers with a large budget). We then list the attacks that have been developed for the important and commonly used ciphers and indicate which ones have been successfully used in practice. The known countermeasures against the previously described fault injection attacks are then presented, including intrusion detection and fault detection. We conclude the survey with a discussion on the interaction between fault injection attacks (and the corresponding countermeasures) and power analysis attacks.
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ISSN:0018-9219
1558-2256
DOI:10.1109/JPROC.2012.2188769