Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment

•We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interactions in public-goods games.•The effect of continuous time is muted compared to prisoner's dilemma games.•However, with chat the median subject contributes completely to the public good.•At the median, chat is less than half as effe...

Full description

Saved in:

Bibliographic Details
Published in:	Journal of economic behavior & organization Vol. 108; pp. 212 - 223
Main Authors:	Oprea, Ryan, Charness, Gary, Friedman, Daniel
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.12.2014 Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Subjects:	Blame C72 C92 Communication Continuous time games Coordination D70 Decision Discrete time Economic theory Effects Experiments Game theory Games H41 Policy co-ordination Protocol Public good Public goods Social dilemmas Social interaction Studies Time Treatment methods Voluntary contribution mechanism H41 Voluntary contribution mechanism Continuous time games Public goods D70 C92 C72
ISSN:	0167-2681, 1879-1751
Online Access:	Get full text
Tags:	Add Tag No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!

Abstract	•We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interactions in public-goods games.•The effect of continuous time is muted compared to prisoner's dilemma games.•However, with chat the median subject contributes completely to the public good.•At the median, chat is less than half as effective in discrete time. We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interaction in public-goods games. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous time during a 10-min interval while in another they make them only at 10 discrete points of time during this interval. The effect of continuous time is muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas and the data suggest that widespread coordination problems are to blame. When we add a rich communication protocol, these coordination problems largely disappear and the median subject contributes completely to the public good with no sign of decay over time. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half as effective in discrete time.
AbstractList	We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interaction in public-goods games. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous time during a 10-min interval while in another they make them only at 10 discrete points of time during this interval. The effect of continuous time is muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas and the data suggest that widespread coordination problems are to blame. When we add a rich communication protocol, these coordination problems largely disappear and the median subject contributes completely to the public good with no sign of decay over time. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half as effective in discrete time. •We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interactions in public-goods games.•The effect of continuous time is muted compared to prisoner's dilemma games.•However, with chat the median subject contributes completely to the public good.•At the median, chat is less than half as effective in discrete time. We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interaction in public-goods games. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous time during a 10-min interval while in another they make them only at 10 discrete points of time during this interval. The effect of continuous time is muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas and the data suggest that widespread coordination problems are to blame. When we add a rich communication protocol, these coordination problems largely disappear and the median subject contributes completely to the public good with no sign of decay over time. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half as effective in discrete time. We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interaction in public-goods games. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous time during a 10-min interval while in another they make them only at 10 discrete points of time during this interval. The effect of continuous time is muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas and the data suggest that widespread coordination problems are to blame. When we add a rich communication protocol, these coordination problems largely disappear and the median subject contributes completely to the public good with no sign of decay over time. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half as effective in discrete time. All rights reserved, Elsevier
Author	Friedman, Daniel Oprea, Ryan Charness, Gary
Author_xml	– sequence: 1 givenname: Ryan surname: Oprea fullname: Oprea, Ryan email: roprea@gmail.com organization: Economics Department, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, United States – sequence: 2 givenname: Gary surname: Charness fullname: Charness, Gary email: charness@econ.ucsb.edu organization: Economics Department, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2127 North Hall, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, United States – sequence: 3 givenname: Daniel surname: Friedman fullname: Friedman, Daniel email: dan@cats.ucsc.ed organization: Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, 401 Engineering 2 Building, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, United States
BookMark	eNp9kE1LwzAYgINMcFP_gKeCFy-tedM1TUAEGX6B4EXPIUvfSUqXzCQV_fdmztMOC4Fcnid588zIxHmHhFwArYACv-6rHpe-YhTmFZUVBXZEpiBaWULbwIRMM9SWjAs4IbMYe5pXy-SU3C68S9aNfoxFsmsstOsK49fr0Vmjk_WusK7QxWZcDtaUH953scDvDYYMu3RGjld6iHj-f56S94f7t8VT-fL6-Ly4eynNXEIqAVjXQK0FX6FsO2SSmsbIRtQgjMbWmK6tZcNrzpf1dqPgoA1txFKwjvL6lFzt7t0E_zliTGpto8Fh0A7z6Ar4nHPJQYiMXu6hvR-Dy9NlquaQn2lYpsSOMsHHGHCljE1__01B20EBVduwqlfbsGobVlGpctissj11k2Po8HNYutlJmCt9WQwqGovOYGcDmqQ6bw_pvy93kos
CODEN	JEBOD9
CitedBy_id	crossref_primary_10_1007_s42973_023_00133_6 crossref_primary_10_1007_s11150_019_09465_y crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2023_04_033 crossref_primary_10_1287_mnsc_2023_01955 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jpubeco_2017_09_002 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_geb_2017_10_021 crossref_primary_10_1007_s40881_015_0009_z crossref_primary_10_1016_j_geb_2023_08_017 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2017_07_013 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2735750 crossref_primary_10_1007_s00199_018_1146_4 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_2668518 crossref_primary_10_1007_s00267_023_01825_w crossref_primary_10_1007_s10683_017_9550_3 crossref_primary_10_1371_journal_pone_0234434 crossref_primary_10_1017_S0140525X18002170 crossref_primary_10_1146_annurev_environ_112321_082450 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_geb_2023_03_005 crossref_primary_10_1007_s11403_021_00334_5 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_geb_2017_08_002 crossref_primary_10_1287_mnsc_2018_3210 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10640_022_00700_2 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2019_07_003 crossref_primary_10_1162_rest_a_00961 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10640_015_9879_z crossref_primary_10_1002_soej_12485 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_socec_2022_101931 crossref_primary_10_3389_fmars_2021_644056 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_3706421 crossref_primary_10_1371_journal_pone_0283196 crossref_primary_10_1371_journal_pone_0151670 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2019_02_031 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2017_05_008 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_euroecorev_2015_08_001 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jet_2022_105488 crossref_primary_10_1080_10242694_2025_2513080 crossref_primary_10_1007_s11403_016_0172_1 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_geb_2018_10_003 crossref_primary_10_2139_ssrn_4294660 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2021_09_001 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_socec_2018_05_002 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_joep_2015_08_007 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2025_106943 crossref_primary_10_1080_00036846_2022_2129576 crossref_primary_10_1038_s41467_022_34160_5 crossref_primary_10_1007_s10640_021_00645_y crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2021_03_022 crossref_primary_10_3982_QE1389 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_geb_2017_02_016 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_respol_2016_07_008 crossref_primary_10_1257_aer_20171014 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jpubeco_2022_104744 crossref_primary_10_1111_joes_12698
Cites_doi	10.2307/1913627 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.007 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x 10.1177/01461672012712009 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.008 10.1126/science.1164744 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1 10.2307/2786924 10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.009 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.02.018 10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 10.1007/BF00140922 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00120-6 10.1006/game.1999.0776 10.1257/aer.102.1.337 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.009 10.1257/aer.97.4.1340 10.2307/1964229 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.001 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.014 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.6.1223 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007 10.1111/1467-9442.00182 10.1257/aer.100.1.541 10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00452.x 10.1257/aer.101.4.1211 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.03.005 10.1006/game.1996.0013 10.1007/s10683-013-9387-3 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2011.00543.x
ContentType	Journal Article
Copyright	2014 Elsevier B.V. Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Dec 2014
Copyright_xml	– notice: 2014 Elsevier B.V. – notice: Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Dec 2014
DBID	AAYXX CITATION 7QJ 8BJ FQK JBE
DOI	10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012
DatabaseName	CrossRef Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences International Bibliography of the Social Sciences
DatabaseTitle	CrossRef International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA)
DatabaseTitleList	International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS) International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
DeliveryMethod	fulltext_linktorsrc
Discipline	Business
EISSN	1879-1751
EndPage	223
ExternalDocumentID	3526065851 10_1016_j_jebo_2014_09_012 S0167268114002509
Genre	Feature
GroupedDBID	--K --M -~X .~1 0R~ 13V 1B1 1OL 1RT 1~. 1~5 29K 3R3 4.4 457 4G. 5GY 5VS 63O 6TJ 7-5 71M 8P~ 9JO AABNK AACTN AADFP AAEDT AAEDW AAFFL AAGJA AAIAV AAIKJ AAKOC AALRI AAOAW AAPFB AAQFI AAQXK AAXUO ABFNM ABIVO ABJNI ABKBG ABLJU ABMAC ABMVD ABOYX ABXDB ABYKQ ACDAQ ACGFO ACGFS ACHQT ACHRH ACNTT ACRLP ACROA ADBBV ADEZE ADFHU ADIYS ADMUD AEBSH AEKER AEYQN AFFNX AFKWA AFODL AFTJW AFYLN AGHFR AGTHC AGUBO AGYEJ AHHHB AI. AIEXJ AIIAU AIKHN AITUG AJBFU AJOXV AJWLA ALEQD ALMA_UNASSIGNED_HOLDINGS AMFUW AMRAJ ASPBG AVWKF AXJTR AXLSJ AZFZN BEHZQ BEZPJ BGSCR BKOJK BKOMP BLXMC BNSAS BNTGB BPUDD BULVW BZJEE CS3 D-I DU5 EBS EFJIC EFLBG EJD EO8 EO9 EP2 EP3 F0J F5P FDB FEDTE FGOYB FIRID FNPLU FYGXN G-2 G-Q GBLVA HLX HMB HVGLF HZ~ IHE IXIXF J1W KOM LG8 LPU LY5 M41 MO0 MS~ N9A O-L O9- OAUVE OZT P-8 P-9 P2P PC. PQQKQ Q38 R2- RIG ROL RPZ SBM SCC SDF SDG SDP SEB SEE SES SEW SPCBC SSB SSF SSY SSZ T5K TN5 UQL VH1 WUQ XPP YK3 YQT ZKB ZMT ~G- 9DU AATTM AAXKI AAYWO AAYXX ABUFD ABWVN ACLOT ACRPL ACVFH ADCNI ADMHG ADNMO AEIPS AEUPX AFJKZ AFPUW AGQPQ AIGII AIIUN AKBMS AKRWK AKYEP ANKPU APXCP CITATION EFKBS ~HD 7QJ 8BJ FQK JBE
ID	FETCH-LOGICAL-c491t-112d513a86fe97de290c5c958318cae7ccd73956366b36b36e861ac058b82d063
ISICitedReferencesCount	58
ISICitedReferencesURI	http://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=Summon&SrcAuth=ProQuest&DestLinkType=CitingArticles&DestApp=WOS_CPL&KeyUT=000347599300015&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com%2F%23%21%2Fsearch%3Fho%3Df%26include.ft.matches%3Dt%26l%3Dnull%26q%3D
ISSN	0167-2681
IngestDate	Sun Nov 09 11:23:39 EST 2025 Mon Nov 10 06:12:25 EST 2025 Tue Nov 18 22:38:24 EST 2025 Sat Nov 29 06:12:43 EST 2025 Fri Feb 23 02:26:51 EST 2024
IsPeerReviewed	true
IsScholarly	true
Keywords	H41 Voluntary contribution mechanism Continuous time games Public goods D70 C92 C72
Language	English
LinkModel	OpenURL
MergedId	FETCHMERGED-LOGICAL-c491t-112d513a86fe97de290c5c958318cae7ccd73956366b36b36e861ac058b82d063
Notes	SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 23
PQID	1636195652
PQPubID	45653
PageCount	12
ParticipantIDs	proquest_miscellaneous_1646696188 proquest_journals_1636195652 crossref_citationtrail_10_1016_j_jebo_2014_09_012 crossref_primary_10_1016_j_jebo_2014_09_012 elsevier_sciencedirect_doi_10_1016_j_jebo_2014_09_012
PublicationCentury	2000
PublicationDate	2014-12-01
PublicationDateYYYYMMDD	2014-12-01
PublicationDate_xml	– month: 12 year: 2014 text: 2014-12-01 day: 01
PublicationDecade	2010
PublicationPlace	Amsterdam
PublicationPlace_xml	– name: Amsterdam
PublicationTitle	Journal of economic behavior & organization
PublicationYear	2014
Publisher	Elsevier B.V Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Publisher_xml	– name: Elsevier B.V – name: Elsevier Sequoia S.A
References	Ben-Ner, Putterman, Ren (bib0200) 2011; 40 Cinyabuguma, Page, Putterman (bib0070) 2005; 89 Guth, Levati, Sutter, van der Heijden (bib0115) 2007; 91 Oprea, Henwood, Friedman (bib0155) 2011; 146 Duffy, Ochs, Vesterlund (bib0090) 2007; 91 Keser, van Winden (bib0130) 2000; 102 Sonnemans, Schram, Offerman (bib0185) 1999; 62 Bigoni, Casari, Skrzypacz, Spagnolo (bib0015) 2013 Page, Putterman, Unel (bib0165) 2005; 115 Fischbacher, Gächter (bib0205) 2010; 100 Charness, Dufwenberg (bib0045) 2010; 107 Charness, Dufwenberg (bib0050) 2011; 101 Charness (bib0035) 2000; 33 Hoggatt, Friedman, Gill (bib0120) 1976; 66 Dorsey (bib0085) 1992; 73 Pettit, James, Kephart, Curtis, Friedman, Daniel, forthcoming. Software for continuous game experiments. Exper. Econ. Simon, Stinchcombe (bib0180) 1989; 57 Brandts, Schram (bib0030) 2001; 79 Chaudhuri (bib0065) 2011; 14 Charness, Rigotti, Rustichini (bib0055) 2007; 97 Gächter (bib0105) 2007 Potters, Sefton, Vesterlund (bib0175) 2005; 89 Charness, Yang (bib0060) 2014; 102 Kurzban, McCabe FS Kevin, Smith, Wilson (bib0135) 2001; 27 Yamagishi (bib0195) 1988; 51 Friedman, Oprea (bib0100) 2012; 102 Brandts, Charness, Ellman (bib0020) 2011 Brandts, Cooper (bib0025) 2007; 5 Levy, Padgitt, Peart, Houser, Xiao (bib0145) 2011; 77 Ahn, Mark Isaac, Salmon (bib0005) 2009; 93 Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, Ross (bib0075) 1996; 12 Ledyard (bib0140) 1995 Yamagishi (bib0190) 1986; 51 Fischbacher, Gächter, Fehr (bib0095) 2001; 71 Gächter, Renner, Sefton (bib0110) 2008; 322 Charness, Dufwenberg (bib0040) 2006; 74 Denant-Beaumont, Masclet, Noussair (bib0080) 2011; 16 Ostrom, Walker, Gardner (bib0160) 1992; 86 Masclet, Noussair, Villeval (bib0210) 2013; 51 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0170 Gächter (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0110) 2008; 322 Fischbacher (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0095) 2001; 71 Chaudhuri (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0065) 2011; 14 Fischbacher (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0205) 2010; 100 Friedman (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0100) 2012; 102 Masclet (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0210) 2013; 51 Ben-Ner (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0200) 2011; 40 Cooper (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0075) 1996; 12 Cinyabuguma (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0070) 2005; 89 Yamagishi (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0190) 1986; 51 Duffy (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0090) 2007; 91 Charness (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0035) 2000; 33 Brandts (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0025) 2007; 5 Charness (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0055) 2007; 97 Kurzban (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0135) 2001; 27 Ledyard (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0140) 1995 Yamagishi (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0195) 1988; 51 Oprea (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0155) 2011; 146 Potters (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0175) 2005; 89 Brandts (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0030) 2001; 79 Gächter (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0105) 2007 Bigoni (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0015) 2013 Keser (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0130) 2000; 102 Brandts (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0020) 2011 Guth (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0115) 2007; 91 Ostrom (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0160) 1992; 86 Dorsey (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0085) 1992; 73 Denant-Beaumont (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0080) 2011; 16 Page (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0165) 2005; 115 Sonnemans (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0185) 1999; 62 Charness (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0040) 2006; 74 Levy (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0145) 2011; 77 Hoggatt (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0120) 1976; 66 Simon (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0180) 1989; 57 Charness (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0050) 2011; 101 Charness (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0060) 2014; 102 Ahn (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0005) 2009; 93 Charness (10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0045) 2010; 107
References_xml	– volume: 93 start-page: 336 year: 2009 end-page: 351 ident: bib0005 article-title: Coming and going: experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods publication-title: J. Public Econ. – volume: 12 start-page: 187 year: 1996 end-page: 318 ident: bib0075 article-title: Cooperation without reputation: experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games publication-title: Games Econ. Behav. – volume: 115 start-page: 1032 year: 2005 end-page: 1053 ident: bib0165 article-title: Voluntary association in public goods experiments: reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency publication-title: Econ. J. – start-page: 19 year: 2007 end-page: 50 ident: bib0105 article-title: Conditional cooperation: behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications publication-title: Psychology and Economics: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field – volume: 27 start-page: 1662 year: 2001 end-page: 1673 ident: bib0135 article-title: Incremental commitment and reciprocity in a real-time public good s game publication-title: Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. – volume: 62 start-page: 35 year: 1999 end-page: 41 ident: bib0185 article-title: Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart publication-title: Econ. Lett. – year: 2013 ident: bib0015 article-title: Time horizon and cooperation in continuous time publication-title: Econometrica – volume: 71 start-page: 397 year: 2001 end-page: 404 ident: bib0095 article-title: Are people conditionally cooperative?. Evidence from a public goods experiment publication-title: Econ. Lett. – volume: 51 start-page: 110 year: 1986 end-page: 116 ident: bib0190 article-title: The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good publication-title: J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. – volume: 101 start-page: 1213 year: 2011 end-page: 1239 ident: bib0050 article-title: Participation publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. – volume: 91 start-page: 1023 year: 2007 end-page: 1042 ident: bib0115 article-title: Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments publication-title: J. Public Econ. – volume: 146 start-page: 2206 year: 2011 end-page: 2225 ident: bib0155 article-title: Separating the Hawks from the Doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games publication-title: J. Econ. Theory – volume: 102 start-page: 23 year: 2000 end-page: 39 ident: bib0130 article-title: Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods publication-title: Scand. J. Econ. – volume: 79 start-page: 399 year: 2001 end-page: 427 ident: bib0030 article-title: Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach publication-title: J. Public Econ. – volume: 102 start-page: 337 year: 2012 end-page: 363 ident: bib0100 article-title: A continuous dilemma publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. – volume: 33 start-page: 177 year: 2000 end-page: 194 ident: bib0035 article-title: Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture publication-title: Games Econ. Behav. – volume: 102 start-page: 119 year: 2014 end-page: 132 ident: bib0060 article-title: Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public-goods provision publication-title: J. Econ. Behav. Organ. – volume: 100 start-page: 541 year: 2010 end-page: 556 ident: bib0205 article-title: Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. – volume: 91 start-page: 1708 year: 2007 end-page: 1730 ident: bib0090 article-title: Giving little by little: dynamic voluntary contribution games publication-title: J. Public Econ. – year: 1995 ident: bib0140 article-title: Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research. Handbook of Experimental Economics – volume: 57 start-page: 1171 year: 1989 end-page: 1214 ident: bib0180 article-title: Extensive form games in continuous time: pure strategies publication-title: Econometrica – volume: 89 start-page: 1421 year: 2005 end-page: 1435 ident: bib0070 article-title: Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment publication-title: J. Public Econ. – volume: 89 start-page: 1399 year: 2005 end-page: 1419 ident: bib0175 article-title: After you—endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games publication-title: J. Public Econ. – year: 2011 ident: bib0020 article-title: Let's Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design. Working paper – volume: 51 start-page: 265 year: 1988 end-page: 271 ident: bib0195 article-title: The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good publication-title: Soc. Psychol.Q – volume: 66 start-page: 261 year: 1976 end-page: 266 ident: bib0120 article-title: Price signaling in experimental oligopoly publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. – volume: 86 start-page: 404 year: 1992 end-page: 417 ident: bib0160 article-title: Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible publication-title: Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. – volume: 14 start-page: 47 year: 2011 end-page: 83 ident: bib0065 article-title: Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature publication-title: Exper. Econ. – volume: 73 start-page: 261 year: 1992 end-page: 282 ident: bib0085 article-title: The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions publication-title: Public Choice – volume: 107 start-page: 281 year: 2010 end-page: 283 ident: bib0045 article-title: Bare promises: an experiment publication-title: Econ. Lett. – volume: 322 start-page: 1510 year: 2008 ident: bib0110 article-title: The long-run benefits of punishment publication-title: Science – volume: 40 start-page: 1 year: 2011 end-page: 13 ident: bib0200 article-title: Lavish Returns on Cheap Talk: Nonbinding Communication in a Trust Experiment publication-title: J. Socio-Econ. – volume: 51 start-page: 1421 year: 2013 end-page: 1441 ident: bib0210 article-title: Threat and punishment in public goods experiments publication-title: Econ. Inquiry – volume: 5 start-page: 1223 year: 2007 end-page: 1268 ident: bib0025 article-title: It's not what you pay, it's what you say: an experimental study of manager–employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure publication-title: J. Europ. Econ. Assoc. – volume: 97 start-page: 1340 year: 2007 end-page: 1352 ident: bib0055 article-title: Individual behavior and group membership publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. – volume: 16 start-page: 207 year: 2011 end-page: 228 ident: bib0080 article-title: Announcement, observation, and honesty in the voluntary contributions game publication-title: Pacific Econ. Rev. – reference: Pettit, James, Kephart, Curtis, Friedman, Daniel, forthcoming. Software for continuous game experiments. Exper. Econ. – volume: 77 start-page: 40 year: 2011 end-page: 52 ident: bib0145 article-title: Leadership: cheap talk, real cheap talk publication-title: J. Econ. Behav. Organ. – volume: 74 start-page: 1579 year: 2006 end-page: 1601 ident: bib0040 article-title: Promises and partnership publication-title: Econometrica – volume: 57 start-page: 1171 issue: 5 year: 1989 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0180 article-title: Extensive form games in continuous time: pure strategies publication-title: Econometrica doi: 10.2307/1913627 – volume: 93 start-page: 336 issue: 1–2 year: 2009 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0005 article-title: Coming and going: experiments on endogenous group sizes for excludable public goods publication-title: J. Public Econ. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.06.007 – volume: 115 start-page: 1032 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0165 article-title: Voluntary association in public goods experiments: reciprocity, mimicry and efficiency publication-title: Econ. J. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2005.01031.x – volume: 27 start-page: 1662 issue: 12 year: 2001 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0135 article-title: Incremental commitment and reciprocity in a real-time public good s game publication-title: Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. doi: 10.1177/01461672012712009 – volume: 89 start-page: 1399 issue: 8 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0175 article-title: After you—endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games publication-title: J. Public Econ. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.008 – start-page: 19 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0105 article-title: Conditional cooperation: behavioral regularities from the lab and the field and their policy implications – volume: 322 start-page: 1510 issue: 5907 year: 2008 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0110 article-title: The long-run benefits of punishment publication-title: Science doi: 10.1126/science.1164744 – volume: 62 start-page: 35 issue: 1 year: 1999 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0185 article-title: Strategic behavior in public good games: when partners drift apart publication-title: Econ. Lett. doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00203-1 – volume: 51 start-page: 265 issue: 3 year: 1988 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0195 article-title: The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good publication-title: Soc. Psychol.Q doi: 10.2307/2786924 – volume: 40 start-page: 1 issue: 1 year: 2011 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0200 article-title: Lavish Returns on Cheap Talk: Nonbinding Communication in a Trust Experiment publication-title: J. Socio-Econ. doi: 10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.009 – volume: 89 start-page: 1421 year: 2005 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0070 article-title: Cooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment publication-title: J. Public Econ. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011 – volume: 77 start-page: 40 year: 2011 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0145 article-title: Leadership: cheap talk, real cheap talk publication-title: J. Econ. Behav. Organ. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2010.02.018 – volume: 51 start-page: 110 issue: 1 year: 1986 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0190 article-title: The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good publication-title: J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 – volume: 73 start-page: 261 year: 1992 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0085 article-title: The voluntary contributions mechanism with real time revisions publication-title: Public Choice doi: 10.1007/BF00140922 – year: 1995 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0140 – volume: 79 start-page: 399 issue: 2 year: 2001 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0030 article-title: Cooperation and noise in public goods experiments: applying the contribution function approach publication-title: J. Public Econ. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00120-6 – volume: 33 start-page: 177 issue: 2 year: 2000 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0035 article-title: Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture publication-title: Games Econ. Behav. doi: 10.1006/game.1999.0776 – volume: 102 start-page: 337 issue: 1 year: 2012 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0100 article-title: A continuous dilemma publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. doi: 10.1257/aer.102.1.337 – volume: 107 start-page: 281 issue: 2 year: 2010 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0045 article-title: Bare promises: an experiment publication-title: Econ. Lett. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.009 – volume: 97 start-page: 1340 issue: 4 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0055 article-title: Individual behavior and group membership publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. doi: 10.1257/aer.97.4.1340 – volume: 86 start-page: 404 issue: 2 year: 1992 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0160 article-title: Covenants with and without a sword: self-governance is possible publication-title: Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. doi: 10.2307/1964229 – volume: 91 start-page: 1708 issue: 9 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0090 article-title: Giving little by little: dynamic voluntary contribution games publication-title: J. Public Econ. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.001 – volume: 146 start-page: 2206 issue: 6 year: 2011 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0155 article-title: Separating the Hawks from the Doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games publication-title: J. Econ. Theory doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.014 – volume: 5 start-page: 1223 issue: 6 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0025 article-title: It's not what you pay, it's what you say: an experimental study of manager–employee relationships in overcoming coordination failure publication-title: J. Europ. Econ. Assoc. doi: 10.1162/JEEA.2007.5.6.1223 – volume: 91 start-page: 1023 issue: 5–6 year: 2007 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0115 article-title: Leading by example with and without exclusion power in voluntary contribution experiments publication-title: J. Public Econ. doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.10.007 – volume: 66 start-page: 261 issue: 2 year: 1976 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0120 article-title: Price signaling in experimental oligopoly publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. – volume: 102 start-page: 23 issue: 1 year: 2000 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0130 article-title: Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods publication-title: Scand. J. Econ. doi: 10.1111/1467-9442.00182 – volume: 100 start-page: 541 issue: 1 year: 2010 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0205 article-title: Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. doi: 10.1257/aer.100.1.541 – volume: 14 start-page: 47 issue: 1 year: 2011 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0065 article-title: Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature publication-title: Exper. Econ. doi: 10.1007/s10683-010-9257-1 – volume: 71 start-page: 397 issue: 3 year: 2001 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0095 article-title: Are people conditionally cooperative?. Evidence from a public goods experiment publication-title: Econ. Lett. doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00394-9 – volume: 74 start-page: 1579 year: 2006 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0040 article-title: Promises and partnership publication-title: Econometrica doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x – volume: 51 start-page: 1421 issue: 2 year: 2013 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0210 article-title: Threat and punishment in public goods experiments publication-title: Econ. Inquiry doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00452.x – volume: 101 start-page: 1213 year: 2011 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0050 article-title: Participation publication-title: Am. Econ. Rev. doi: 10.1257/aer.101.4.1211 – volume: 102 start-page: 119 year: 2014 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0060 article-title: Starting small toward voluntary formation of efficient large groups in public-goods provision publication-title: J. Econ. Behav. Organ. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.03.005 – volume: 12 start-page: 187 year: 1996 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0075 article-title: Cooperation without reputation: experimental evidence from prisoner's dilemma games publication-title: Games Econ. Behav. doi: 10.1006/game.1996.0013 – ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0170 doi: 10.1007/s10683-013-9387-3 – year: 2013 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0015 article-title: Time horizon and cooperation in continuous time publication-title: Econometrica – volume: 16 start-page: 207 issue: 2 year: 2011 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0080 article-title: Announcement, observation, and honesty in the voluntary contributions game publication-title: Pacific Econ. Rev. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0106.2011.00543.x – year: 2011 ident: 10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012_bib0020
SSID	ssj0000729
Score	2.379018
Snippet	•We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interactions in public-goods games.•The effect of continuous time is muted compared to prisoner's... We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interaction in public-goods games. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions...
SourceID	proquest crossref elsevier
SourceType	Aggregation Database Enrichment Source Index Database Publisher
StartPage	212
SubjectTerms	Blame C72 C92 Communication Continuous time games Coordination D70 Decision Discrete time Economic theory Effects Experiments Game theory Games H41 Policy co-ordination Protocol Public good Public goods Social dilemmas Social interaction Studies Time Treatment methods Voluntary contribution mechanism
Title	Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment
URI	https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012 https://www.proquest.com/docview/1636195652 https://www.proquest.com/docview/1646696188
Volume	108
WOSCitedRecordID	wos000347599300015&url=https%3A%2F%2Fcvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com%2F%23%21%2Fsearch%3Fho%3Df%26include.ft.matches%3Dt%26l%3Dnull%26q%3D
hasFullText	1
inHoldings	1
isFullTextHit
isPrint
journalDatabaseRights	– providerCode: PRVESC databaseName: Elsevier SD Freedom Collection Journals 2021 customDbUrl: eissn: 1879-1751 dateEnd: 99991231 omitProxy: false ssIdentifier: ssj0000729 issn: 0167-2681 databaseCode: AIEXJ dateStart: 19950101 isFulltext: true titleUrlDefault: https://www.sciencedirect.com providerName: Elsevier
link	http://cvtisr.summon.serialssolutions.com/2.0.0/link/0/eLvHCXMwtV3da9swEBdZO8Zexj5Zt254sD4VhVj-kl4GYUvYRskGTSFvwpaUkVDstElK94_s792dJX-FNWwPg2CCZZtE9_Pd6XS_O0LeD-YCzYCizMwVBY84pFkoMqojjTLXaCTLZhPJZMJnM_G91_tVcWFuLpM857e3YvVfRQ3nQNhInf0HcdcPhRPwHYQORxA7HP9K8FhvapFvMbUVG8dXxLWGBoIhjtTVt6Y_ikKvW3X-73BWjeMv17T-EjJFi8hZR2tX4IaWgvvZAA839VGnllH4tMk8HsNCXbsYrCW7t6MQfriT0VHTY87N1bZYpKfn_WE7agnamMW2N0vfWE3LE0HBd_E7qnjAO8qU_VHJ23jDsr8EjYzJebZSrcvG7lTUnnyT44uzMzkdzabdUWvBI1jNxbgxehKMV1cUe5Hhnv1J8Mni4h45ZEkkQFseDr-MZl8bG5-U_e_qP-boWDZzcPd33eXy7Bj_0qOZPiaPnHS9oYXQE9Iz-VPyoGJCPCMfGiR5iCQPkOR1kOQtci_12kjyGiQ9Jxfj0fTjZ-rabVAVCn9DwfPWkR-kPJ4bkWjDxEBFSkQc1L5KTaKUxl3dOIjjLMCP4bGfqkHEM840uLovyEFe5OYl8QyLGNeCpWGahFyHWcYNyzJYKsCVYCGOiF_NiFSuFj22RLmUVdLhUuIsSpxFORASZvGInNb3rGwllr1XR9VES-dLWh9RAor23ndcSUW6l3otYc0SI682guF39TDoYdxcS3MDcpBYpy_G9kn81f5HvCYPmxfomBxsrrfmDbmvbjaL9fVbB7Tfyc-mxg
linkProvider	Elsevier
openUrl	ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info%3Asid%2Fsummon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Ajournal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Continuous+time+and+communication+in+a+public-goods+experiment&rft.jtitle=Journal+of+economic+behavior+%26+organization&rft.au=Oprea%2C+Ryan&rft.au=Charness%2C+Gary&rft.au=Friedman%2C+Daniel&rft.date=2014-12-01&rft.pub=Elsevier+Sequoia+S.A&rft.issn=0167-2681&rft.eissn=1879-1751&rft.volume=108&rft.spage=212&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016%2Fj.jebo.2014.09.012&rft.externalDBID=NO_FULL_TEXT&rft.externalDocID=3526065851
thumbnail_l	http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/lc.gif&issn=0167-2681&client=summon
thumbnail_m	http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/mc.gif&issn=0167-2681&client=summon
thumbnail_s	http://covers-cdn.summon.serialssolutions.com/index.aspx?isbn=/sc.gif&issn=0167-2681&client=summon