Continuous time and communication in a public-goods experiment

•We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interactions in public-goods games.•The effect of continuous time is muted compared to prisoner's dilemma games.•However, with chat the median subject contributes completely to the public good.•At the median, chat is less than half as effe...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economic behavior & organization Jg. 108; S. 212 - 223
Hauptverfasser: Oprea, Ryan, Charness, Gary, Friedman, Daniel
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Amsterdam Elsevier B.V 01.12.2014
Elsevier Sequoia S.A
Schlagworte:
Blame
C72
C92
Communication
Continuous time games
Coordination
D70
Decision
Discrete time
Economic theory
Effects
Experiments
Game theory
Games
H41
Policy co-ordination
Protocol
Public good
Public goods
Social dilemmas
Social interaction
Studies
Time
Treatment methods
Voluntary contribution mechanism
H41
Voluntary contribution mechanism
Continuous time games
Public goods
D70
C92
C72
ISSN:0167-2681, 1879-1751
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:•We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interactions in public-goods games.•The effect of continuous time is muted compared to prisoner's dilemma games.•However, with chat the median subject contributes completely to the public good.•At the median, chat is less than half as effective in discrete time. We investigate the nature of continuous time strategic interaction in public-goods games. In one set of treatments, four subjects make contribution decisions in continuous time during a 10-min interval while in another they make them only at 10 discrete points of time during this interval. The effect of continuous time is muted in public-goods games compared to simpler social dilemmas and the data suggest that widespread coordination problems are to blame. When we add a rich communication protocol, these coordination problems largely disappear and the median subject contributes completely to the public good with no sign of decay over time. At the median, the same communication protocol is less than half as effective in discrete time.
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ISSN:0167-2681
1879-1751
DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2014.09.012