Energy pricing and demand scheduling in retail market: how microgrids’ integration affects the market

This study proposes a single‐leader‐multi follower game to model a bilevel retail market among an aggregator and multiple microgrids to determine the optimal demand scheduling of the consumer, as well as price‐power bidding strategies of microgrids in an interactive scheme. In the lower level, micro...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	IET smart grid Jg. 3; H. 3; S. 309 - 317
Hauptverfasser:	Ahmadi, Fatemeh, Akrami, Alireza, Doostizadeh, Meysam, Aminifar, Farrokh
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Durham The Institution of Engineering and Technology 01.06.2020 John Wiley & Sons, Inc Wiley
Schlagworte:	aggregator B0240E Game theory B0260 Optimisation techniques B8110B Power system management, operation and economics B8120K Distributed power generation bilevel optimisation bilevel retail market Competition Consumers Decision making Demand demand side management distributed energy resources Distributed generation distributed power generation energy dispatch energy payment Energy sources Energy storage energy storage units Game theory generation units individual profit Integer programming interactive scheme interruptible loads Karush–Kuhn–Tucker optimality condition Linear programming Markets mixed-integer linear programming problem multiple microgrids optimal demand scheduling optimal energy-price bids Optimization Power Power dispatch power generation economics power generation scheduling power markets price-power bidding strategies Prices Pricing profitability real-time pricing retail market clearance mechanism Scheduling shiftable loads single-leader-multifollower game Smart grid technology Stackelberg game Storage units upper-level problem Utility functions
ISSN:	2515-2947, 2515-2947
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!