A multi-product green supply chain under government supervision with price and demand uncertainty

In this paper, a bi-level game-theoretic model is proposed to investigate the effects of governmental financial intervention on green supply chain. This problem is formulated as a bi-level program for a green supply chain that produces various products with different environmental pollution levels....

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of industrial engineering international Vol. 15; no. 1; pp. 193 - 206
Main Authors: Hafezalkotob, Ashkan, Zamani, Soma
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Heidelberg Springer 01.03.2019
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch
Islamic Azad University
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ISSN:2251-712X, 1735-5702, 2251-712X
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:In this paper, a bi-level game-theoretic model is proposed to investigate the effects of governmental financial intervention on green supply chain. This problem is formulated as a bi-level program for a green supply chain that produces various products with different environmental pollution levels. The problem is also regard uncertainties in market demand and sale price of raw materials and products. The model is further transformed into a single-level nonlinear programming problem by replacing the lower-level optimization problem with its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions. Genetic algorithm is applied as a solution methodology to solve nonlinear programming model. Finally, to investigate the validity of the proposed method, the computational results obtained through genetic algorithm are compared with global optimal solution attained by enumerative method. Analytical results indicate that the proposed GA offers better solutions in large size problems. Also, we conclude that financial intervention by government consists of green taxation and subsidization is an effective method to stabilize green supply chain members' performance.
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content type line 14
ISSN:2251-712X
1735-5702
2251-712X
DOI:10.1007/s40092-018-0271-9