Stakes Matter in Ultimatum Games

One of the most robust findings in experimental economics is that individuals in one-shot ultimatum games reject unfair offers. Puzzlingly, rejections have been found robust to substantial increases in stakes. By using a novel experimental design that elicits frequent low offers and uses much larger...

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Vydáno v:	The American economic review Ročník 101; číslo 7; s. 3427 - 3439
Hlavní autoři:	Andersen, Steffen, Ertaç, Seda, Gneezy, Uri, Hoffman, Moshe, List, John A.
Médium:	Journal Article
Jazyk:	angličtina
Vydáno:	Nashville American Economic Association 01.12.2011
Témata:	Bargaining Dictators Earnings Economic costs Economic models Economic theory Economics Equivalence Experiment design Experimental economics Experimental literature Experiments Fairness Game theory Games Logistic regression Management science Novels Research design Shorter Papers Studies Transponders Ultimatum game Wealth Wealth effect
ISSN:	0002-8282, 1944-7981
On-line přístup:	Získat plný text
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