A Multi-Party Functional Signatures Scheme for Private Blockchain

Digital signature technology is essential for ensuring the authenticity and unforgeability of transactions in a private blockchain framework. In some scenarios, transactions require verification from multiple parties, each of whom needs to authenticate different parts of the transaction. To address...

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Vydáno v:Cryptography Ročník 7; číslo 2; s. 21
Hlavní autoři: Zhou, Quan, Zheng, Yulong, Wei, Kaijun, Chen, Minhui, Zeng, Zhikang
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Basel MDPI AG 01.06.2023
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ISSN:2410-387X, 2410-387X
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Shrnutí:Digital signature technology is essential for ensuring the authenticity and unforgeability of transactions in a private blockchain framework. In some scenarios, transactions require verification from multiple parties, each of whom needs to authenticate different parts of the transaction. To address this issue, researchers have developed multi-party ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) signature schemes. However, these schemes either need to consider the authentication of different parts of the transaction or generate an aggregated signature. This paper proposes a novel solution that combines functional signatures and multi-party ECDSA signatures to create a multi-party functional signature for private blockchains. Compared to previous constructions, the proposed scheme ensures that each part of the transaction is verified. Furthermore, when the aggregate signature of the entire transaction cannot be verified, this scheme identifies the specific part of the transaction for which the signature authentication fails instead of rejecting the entire transaction. This paper uses a smart contract to securely deploy the proposed scheme and authenticate the f in functional signatures. The constructed scheme also provides security under the existential unforgeability of the ECDSA signature, even if n−1 parties are corrupted, assuming a total of n parties. The scheme of this paper successfully conducted experiments on a personal computer, with three users taking approximately 343 ms, six users taking 552 ms, and nine users taking 791 ms.
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ISSN:2410-387X
2410-387X
DOI:10.3390/cryptography7020021