Constitutional Dynamics in the European Union: Success, Failure, and Stability of Institutional Treaty Revisions

Despite high institutional hurdles for constitutional change, one observes surprisingly many EU treaty revisions. This article takes up the questions of what determines whether a treaty provision is successfully changed and why provisions are renegotiated at subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences....

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Veröffentlicht in:International journal of public administration Jg. 40; H. 14; S. 1237 - 1249
Hauptverfasser: Dörfler, Thomas, Holzinger, Katharina, Biesenbender, Jan
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: New York Routledge 06.12.2017
Marcel Dekker, Inc
Schlagworte:
Causality
Change agents
Comparative analysis
Conflict
Constitutional evolution
Constitutions
EU treaties
European integration
Negotiation
Political integration
qualitative comparative analysis
Qualitative research
Success
Treaties
treaty change
Europe
ISSN:0190-0692, 1532-4265
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:Despite high institutional hurdles for constitutional change, one observes surprisingly many EU treaty revisions. This article takes up the questions of what determines whether a treaty provision is successfully changed and why provisions are renegotiated at subsequent Intergovernmental Conferences. The article presents an institutionalist theory explaining success and renegotiation and tests the theory using all core institutional provisions by means of Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The causal analysis shows that low conflict potential of an issue is sufficient for successfully changing the treaties. Furthermore, high conflict potential of an issue and its fundamental change are sufficient for it to be renegotiated.
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ISSN:0190-0692
1532-4265
DOI:10.1080/01900692.2017.1295267