Post-war Russian economic growth: not a riddle
In a recent article Steven Rosefielde (2003) has advanced three propositions. He suggests that according to the best available statistics the post-war growth of the Russian economy under the command system was surprisingly good; in fact, he argues that it was too good. The standard for this judgemen...
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| Published in: | Europe-Asia studies Vol. 55; no. 8; pp. 1323 - 1329 |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Abingdon
Taylor & Francis Ltd
01.12.2003
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| Subjects: | |
| ISSN: | 0966-8136, 1465-3427 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | In a recent article Steven Rosefielde (2003) has advanced three propositions. He suggests that according to the best available statistics the post-war growth of the Russian economy under the command system was surprisingly good; in fact, he argues that it was too good. The standard for this judgement is economic theory, which holds that non-market systems must fail by comparison with market economies; Rosefielde associates specifically this view with the 'Washington consensus'. He concludes that it is the statistics that are at fault: they 'lied and were misconstrued' by Western 'statistically oriented comparativists' in a way that was unduly favourable to the command system.
In this comment I argue that Rosefielde has misread both the facts and the theory. There is no riddle in the statistics. His conclusion, therefore, must fall. |
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| Bibliography: | SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-1 content type line 14 ObjectType-Article-2 content type line 23 ObjectType-Article-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 |
| ISSN: | 0966-8136 1465-3427 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/0966813032000141132 |