‘Everybody’s doing it’: on the persistence of bad social norms

We investigate how information about the preferences of others affects the persistence of ‘bad’ social norms. One view is that bad norms thrive even when people are informed of the preferences of others, since the bad norm is an equilibrium of a coordination game. The other view is based on pluralis...

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Vydáno v:Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association Ročník 23; číslo 2; s. 392 - 420
Hlavní autoři: Smerdon, David, Offerman, Theo, Gneezy, Uri
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: New York Springer US 01.06.2020
Springer Nature B.V
Témata:
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
Coordination
Economic theory
Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods
Economics
Economics and Finance
Game Theory
Ignorance
Microeconomics
Multiculturalism & pluralism
Norms
Operations Research/Decision Theory
Original Paper
Social and Behav. Sciences
Social interaction
Social norms
Uncertainty
Pluralistic ignorance
Social interactions
Equilibrium selection
Z10
D90
D70
Conformity
C92
Social norms
ISSN:1386-4157, 1573-6938
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Shrnutí:We investigate how information about the preferences of others affects the persistence of ‘bad’ social norms. One view is that bad norms thrive even when people are informed of the preferences of others, since the bad norm is an equilibrium of a coordination game. The other view is based on pluralistic ignorance, in which uncertainty about others’ preferences is crucial. In an experiment, we find clear support for the pluralistic ignorance perspective . In addition, the strength of social interactions is important for a bad norm to persist. These findings help in understanding the causes of such bad norms, and in designing interventions to change them.
Bibliografie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
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ISSN:1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI:10.1007/s10683-019-09616-z