Formal security proofs with minimal fuss: Implicit computational complexity at work

We show how implicit computational complexity can be used in order to increase confidence in game-based security proofs in cryptography. For this purpose we extend CSLR, a probabilistic lambda-calculus with a type system that guarantees the existence of a probabilistic polynomial-time bound on compu...

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Veröffentlicht in:Information and computation Jg. 241; S. 96 - 113
Hauptverfasser: Nowak, David, Zhang, Yu
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: Elsevier Inc 01.04.2015
Elsevier
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ISSN:0890-5401, 1090-2651
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:We show how implicit computational complexity can be used in order to increase confidence in game-based security proofs in cryptography. For this purpose we extend CSLR, a probabilistic lambda-calculus with a type system that guarantees the existence of a probabilistic polynomial-time bound on computations. This allows us to define cryptographic constructions, feasible adversaries, security notions, computational assumptions, game transformations, and game-based security proofs in a unified framework. We also show that the standard practice of cryptographers, ignoring that polynomial-time Turing machines cannot generate all uniform distributions, is actually sound. We illustrate our calculus on cryptographic constructions for public-key encryption and pseudorandom bit generation.
ISSN:0890-5401
1090-2651
DOI:10.1016/j.ic.2014.10.008