A differential game model for closed-loop supply chain participants under carbon emission permits

•Multiple (re)manufacturing plants and distribution/collection centers are in CLSC.•Governments’ carbon emission permits influence participants’ decision in CLSC.•Participants’ decisions are examined from a long-term dynamic perspective.•Subsidies motivate plants to input technology investment to re...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	Computers & industrial engineering Vol. 135; pp. 1077 - 1090
Main Authors:	Yang, Yuxiang, Xu, Xun
Format:	Journal Article
Language:	English
Published:	Elsevier Ltd 01.09.2019
Subjects:	Carbon emission Closed-loop supply chain Differential game Remanufacturing Carbon emission Differential game Remanufacturing Closed-loop supply chain
ISSN:	0360-8352, 1879-0550
Online Access:	Get full text
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