Lobbying and liquidity requirements: Large versus small banks

We design a model with banks of unequal size operating subject to liquidity requirements in an imperfectly-competitive deposit market. We show that large banks have stronger incentives than small ones to lobby in order to relax the liquidity requirements unless they bear significantly higher lobbyin...

Celý popis

Uloženo v:
Podrobná bibliografie
Vydáno v:Journal of financial stability Ročník 74; s. 101316
Hlavní autoři: Shy, Oz, Stenbacka, Rune
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Elsevier B.V 01.10.2024
Témata:
Bank associations
Bank competition
Bank lobbying
Deposit rates
Required liquid reserves
Bank competition
Deposit rates
G21
Bank lobbying
Required liquid reserves
Bank associations
G28
D72
ISSN:1572-3089
On-line přístup:Získat plný text
Tagy: Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
Popis
Shrnutí:We design a model with banks of unequal size operating subject to liquidity requirements in an imperfectly-competitive deposit market. We show that large banks have stronger incentives than small ones to lobby in order to relax the liquidity requirements unless they bear significantly higher lobbying costs. Therefore, lobbying magnifies asymmetries between banks. Furthermore, we establish that the organization of influence activities matters. An industry-wide bank association for lobbying to relax the liquidity requirements suffers from an internal conflict of interest and cannot simultaneously benefit both large and small banks if these have identical lobbying cost functions.
ISSN:1572-3089
DOI:10.1016/j.jfs.2024.101316