Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case

We consider games in which an informed sender first talks at no cost to a receiver; then, the latter proposes a decision and, finally, the sender accepts the proposal or “exits”. We make the following assumptions: the sender has finitely many types, the receiver's decision is real-valued, utili...

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Vydané v:	Games and economic behavior Ročník 134; s. 242 - 263
Hlavní autori:	Sémirat, Stéphan, Forges, Françoise
Médium:	Journal Article Paper
Jazyk:	English
Vydavateľské údaje:	St. Louis Elsevier Inc 01.07.2022 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Elsevier
Predmet:	Discrete cheap talk Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences Participation constraints Quantitative Finance Single-crossing Single-crossing Discrete cheap talk Participation constraints C72 D82 Discrete Cheap talk
ISSN:	0899-8256, 1090-2473
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