Strategic information transmission with sender's approval: The single-crossing case

We consider games in which an informed sender first talks at no cost to a receiver; then, the latter proposes a decision and, finally, the sender accepts the proposal or “exits”. We make the following assumptions: the sender has finitely many types, the receiver's decision is real-valued, utili...

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Bibliographic Details

Published in:	Games and economic behavior Vol. 134; pp. 242 - 263
Main Authors:	Sémirat, Stéphan, Forges, Françoise
Format:	Journal Article Paper
Language:	English
Published:	St. Louis Elsevier Inc 01.07.2022 Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Elsevier
Subjects:	Discrete cheap talk Economics and Finance Humanities and Social Sciences Participation constraints Quantitative Finance Single-crossing Single-crossing Discrete cheap talk Participation constraints C72 D82 Discrete Cheap talk
ISSN:	0899-8256, 1090-2473
Online Access:	Get full text
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