Beyond the Limits of DPA: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks

The problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related information using the lowest possible number of measurements is one of the central questions in side-channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To address it, this work proposes a novel framework...

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Veröffentlicht in:IEEE transactions on computers Jg. 61; H. 8; S. 1153 - 1164
Hauptverfasser: Bogdanov, A., Kizhvatov, I.
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: IEEE 01.08.2012
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ISSN:0018-9340
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Zusammenfassung:The problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related information using the lowest possible number of measurements is one of the central questions in side-channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To address it, this work proposes a novel framework enhancing side-channel collision attacks with divide-and-conquer attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA). An information-theoretical metric is introduced for the evaluation of collision detection efficiency. Improved methods of dimension reduction for side-channel traces are developed based on a statistical model of euclidean distance. Experimental results confirm that DPA-combined collision attacks are superior to both DPA-only and collision-only attacks. The new methods of dimension reduction lead to further complexity improvements. All attacks are treated for the case of AES-128 and are practically validated on a widespread 8-bit RISC microcontroller.
ISSN:0018-9340
DOI:10.1109/TC.2011.140