Beyond the Limits of DPA: Combined Side-Channel Collision Attacks

The problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related information using the lowest possible number of measurements is one of the central questions in side-channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To address it, this work proposes a novel framework...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on computers Vol. 61; no. 8; pp. 1153 - 1164
Main Authors: Bogdanov, A., Kizhvatov, I.
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 01.08.2012
Subjects:
AES
Algorithm design and analysis
Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity
collision attacks
Computational complexity
cryptographic implementations
Cryptography
data encryption
Data mining
Equations
Euclidean distance
physical security
side-channel analysis
ISSN:0018-9340
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The problem of extracting the highest possible amount of key-related information using the lowest possible number of measurements is one of the central questions in side-channel attacks against embedded implementations of cryptographic algorithms. To address it, this work proposes a novel framework enhancing side-channel collision attacks with divide-and-conquer attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA). An information-theoretical metric is introduced for the evaluation of collision detection efficiency. Improved methods of dimension reduction for side-channel traces are developed based on a statistical model of euclidean distance. Experimental results confirm that DPA-combined collision attacks are superior to both DPA-only and collision-only attacks. The new methods of dimension reduction lead to further complexity improvements. All attacks are treated for the case of AES-128 and are practically validated on a widespread 8-bit RISC microcontroller.
ISSN:0018-9340
DOI:10.1109/TC.2011.140