Price of anarchy and an approximation algorithm for the binary-preference capacitated selfish replication game

We consider the capacitated selfish replication (CSR) game with binary preferences, over general undirected networks. We study the price of anarchy of such games, and show that it is bounded above by 3. We develop a quasi-polynomial algorithm O(n2+lnD), where n is the number of players and D is the...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

Veröffentlicht in:	Automatica (Oxford) Jg. 76; S. 153 - 163
Hauptverfasser:	Etesami, Seyed Rasoul, Başar, Tamer
Format:	Journal Article
Sprache:	Englisch
Veröffentlicht:	Elsevier Ltd 01.02.2017
Schlagworte:	Capacitated selfish replication game Optimal allocation Potential function Price of anarchy Pure Nash equilibrium (NE) Quasi-polynomial algorithm Capacitated selfish replication game Quasi-polynomial algorithm Potential function Optimal allocation Pure Nash equilibrium (NE) Price of anarchy
ISSN:	0005-1098, 1873-2836
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!