Campaign Management Under Approval-Driven Voting Rules

Approval-like voting rules, such as sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), the Bucklin rule (an adaptive variant of k -approval voting), and the Fallback rule (a hybrid of the Bucklin rule and SP-AV) have many desirable properties: for example, they are easy to understand and enc...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Algorithmica Vol. 77; no. 1; pp. 84 - 115
Main Authors: Schlotter, Ildiko, Faliszewski, Piotr, Elkind, Edith
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: New York Springer US 01.01.2017
Springer Nature B.V
Subjects:
Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity
Algorithms
Computer Science
Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks
Data Structures and Information Theory
Management
Mathematics of Computing
Theory of Computation
Voters
Voting
Bribery
Campaign management
Bucklin voting
Fallback voting
Parameterized complexity
Approval voting
ISSN:0178-4617, 1432-0541
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Approval-like voting rules, such as sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV), the Bucklin rule (an adaptive variant of k -approval voting), and the Fallback rule (a hybrid of the Bucklin rule and SP-AV) have many desirable properties: for example, they are easy to understand and encourage the candidates to choose electoral platforms that have a broad appeal. In this paper, we investigate both classic and parameterized computational complexity of electoral campaign management under such rules. We focus on two methods that can be used to promote a given candidate: asking voters to move this candidate upwards in their preference order or asking them to change the number of candidates they approve of. We show that finding an optimal campaign management strategy of the first type is easy for both Bucklin and Fallback. In contrast, the second method is computationally hard even if the degree to which we need to affect the votes is small. Nevertheless, we identify a large class of scenarios that admit fixed-parameter tractable algorithms.
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ISSN:0178-4617
1432-0541
DOI:10.1007/s00453-015-0064-0