Fine-grained view on bribery for group identification
Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications . The classical bribery problem in this context asks ho...
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| Published in: | Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems Vol. 37; no. 1; p. 21 |
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
New York
Springer US
01.06.2023
Springer Nature B.V |
| Subjects: | |
| ISSN: | 1387-2532, 1573-7454 |
| Online Access: | Get full text |
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| Summary: | Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a
socially qualified
subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications . The classical bribery problem in this context asks how many agents need to change their qualifications in order to change the outcome in a certain way. Complementing previous results showing polynomial-time solvability or NP-hardness of bribery for various social rules in the constructive (aiming at making specific agents socially qualified) or destructive (aiming at making specific agents socially disqualified) setting, we provide a comprehensive picture of the parameterized computational complexity landscape. Conceptually, we also consider a more fine-grained concept of bribery cost, where we ask how many single qualifications need to be changed, nonunit prices for different bribery actions, and a more general bribery goal that combines the constructive and destructive setting. |
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| Bibliography: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 1387-2532 1573-7454 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s10458-023-09597-7 |