Fine-grained view on bribery for group identification

Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications . The classical bribery problem in this context asks ho...

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Veröffentlicht in:Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems Jg. 37; H. 1; S. 21
Hauptverfasser: Boehmer, Niclas, Bredereck, Robert, Knop, Dušan, Luo, Junjie
Format: Journal Article
Sprache:Englisch
Veröffentlicht: New York Springer US 01.06.2023
Springer Nature B.V
Schlagworte:
Artificial Intelligence
Bribery
Computer Science
Computer Systems Organization and Communication Networks
Consent
Costs
Elections
Identification
Polynomials
Qualifications
Software Engineering/Programming and Operating Systems
Subgroups
User Interfaces and Human Computer Interaction
ISSN:1387-2532, 1573-7454
Online-Zugang:Volltext
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Zusammenfassung:Given a set of agents qualifying or disqualifying each other, group identification is the task of identifying a socially qualified subgroup of agents. Social qualification depends on the specific rule used to aggregate individual qualifications . The classical bribery problem in this context asks how many agents need to change their qualifications in order to change the outcome in a certain way. Complementing previous results showing polynomial-time solvability or NP-hardness of bribery for various social rules in the constructive (aiming at making specific agents socially qualified) or destructive (aiming at making specific agents socially disqualified) setting, we provide a comprehensive picture of the parameterized computational complexity landscape. Conceptually, we also consider a more fine-grained concept of bribery cost, where we ask how many single qualifications need to be changed, nonunit prices for different bribery actions, and a more general bribery goal that combines the constructive and destructive setting.
Bibliographie:ObjectType-Article-1
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ISSN:1387-2532
1573-7454
DOI:10.1007/s10458-023-09597-7