When Morality Opposes Justice: Conservatives Have Moral Intuitions that Liberals may not Recognize

Researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. On this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs appears to be immoral, and has been explained as a product of various non-moral processes suc...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Social justice research Vol. 20; no. 1; pp. 98 - 116
Main Authors: Haidt, Jonathan, Graham, Jesse
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: New York Springer Nature B.V 01.03.2007
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ISSN:0885-7466, 1573-6725
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Researchers in moral psychology and social justice have agreed that morality is about matters of harm, rights, and justice. On this definition of morality, conservative opposition to social justice programs appears to be immoral, and has been explained as a product of various non-moral processes such as system justification or social dominance orientation. In this article we argue that, from an anthropological perspective, the moral domain is usually much broader, encompassing many more aspects of social life and valuing institutions as much or more than individuals. We present theoretical and empirical reasons for believing that there are five psychological systems that provide the foundations for the world's many moralities. The five foundations are psychological preparations for detecting and reacting emotionally to issues related to harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Political liberals have moral intuitions primarily based upon the first two foundations, and therefore misunderstand the moral motivations of political conservatives, who generally rely upon all five foundations. Adapted from the source document.
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ISSN:0885-7466
1573-6725
DOI:10.1007/s11211-007-0034-z