Personhood and a meaningful life in African philosophy
This article proffers a personhood-based conception of a meaningful life. I look into the ethical structure of the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy to develop an account of a meaningful life. In my view, the ethics of personhood is constituted by three components, namely (1) the fact...
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| Vydáno v: | South African journal of philosophy Ročník 39; číslo 2; s. 194 - 207 |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Vydáno: |
Routledge
02.04.2020
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| ISSN: | 0258-0136, 2073-4867 |
| On-line přístup: | Získat plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | This article proffers a personhood-based conception of a meaningful life. I look into the ethical structure of the salient idea of personhood in African philosophy to develop an account of a meaningful life. In my view, the ethics of personhood is constituted by three components, namely (1) the fact of being human, which informs (2) a view of moral status qua the capacity for moral virtue, and (3) which specifies the final good of achieving or developing a morally virtuous character. In light of the ethics of personhood, I will propose the view that a meaningful life is a function of achieving moral excellence or perfection. The moral perfection proposed here, to embody a meaningful life, is of a deontological and satisficing kind. The achievement of satisfactory levels of moral excellence, within sociopolitical and moral limits, captures the essence of a meaningful life. I conclude the article by considering objections against the view proposed here. |
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| ISSN: | 0258-0136 2073-4867 |
| DOI: | 10.1080/02580136.2020.1774980 |