The Algorithmic Leviathan: Arbitrariness, Fairness, and Opportunity in Algorithmic Decision-Making Systems

This article examines the complaint that arbitrary algorithmic decisions wrong those whom they affect. It makes three contributions. First, it provides an analysis of what arbitrariness means in this context. Second, it argues that arbitrariness is not of moral concern except when special circumstan...

Celý popis

Uloženo v:
Podrobná bibliografie
Vydáno v:Canadian journal of philosophy Ročník 52; číslo 1; s. 26 - 43
Hlavní autoři: Creel, Kathleen, Hellman, Deborah
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:angličtina
Vydáno: Edmonton Cambridge University Press 01.01.2022
Témata:
ISSN:0045-5091, 1911-0820
On-line přístup:Získat plný text
Tagy: Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
Popis
Shrnutí:This article examines the complaint that arbitrary algorithmic decisions wrong those whom they affect. It makes three contributions. First, it provides an analysis of what arbitrariness means in this context. Second, it argues that arbitrariness is not of moral concern except when special circumstances apply. However, when the same algorithm or different algorithms based on the same data are used in multiple contexts, a person may be arbitrarily excluded from a broad range of opportunities. The third contribution is to explain why this systemic exclusion is of moral concern and to offer a solution to address it.
Bibliografie:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:0045-5091
1911-0820
DOI:10.1017/can.2022.3