Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014 ), we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study...
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| Vydané v: | Fixed point theory and algorithms for sciences and engineering Ročník 2018; číslo 1; s. 1 - 16 |
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| Hlavný autor: | |
| Médium: | Journal Article |
| Jazyk: | English |
| Vydavateľské údaje: |
Cham
Springer International Publishing
23.04.2018
Springer Nature B.V SpringerOpen |
| Predmet: | |
| ISSN: | 1687-1812, 1687-1812, 2730-5422 |
| On-line prístup: | Získať plný text |
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| Shrnutí: | In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092,
2014
), we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition. |
|---|---|
| Bibliografia: | ObjectType-Article-1 SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1 ObjectType-Feature-2 content type line 14 |
| ISSN: | 1687-1812 1687-1812 2730-5422 |
| DOI: | 10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1 |