Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games

In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014 ), we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study...

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Vydané v:Fixed point theory and algorithms for sciences and engineering Ročník 2018; číslo 1; s. 1 - 16
Hlavný autor: Li, Jinlu
Médium: Journal Article
Jazyk:English
Vydavateľské údaje: Cham Springer International Publishing 23.04.2018
Springer Nature B.V
SpringerOpen
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ISSN:1687-1812, 1687-1812, 2730-5422
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Shrnutí:In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in (J. Math. Anal. Appl. 409:1084–1092, 2014 ), we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition.
Bibliografia:ObjectType-Article-1
SourceType-Scholarly Journals-1
ObjectType-Feature-2
content type line 14
ISSN:1687-1812
1687-1812
2730-5422
DOI:10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1